Scope of Section 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Answered in a recent Judgment passed in July 2026

Scope of Section 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 Answered in a recent Judgment passed in July 2026

S.9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 deals with situation when a party can approach Court for interim measure of protection. S.9 can be invoked before enforcing arbitral award and even after making of arbitral award. S. 9(2) fixes time of 90 days while S.9 (3) connects S. 9(1) with S.17 of the Act.

It has been held that while considering an application under Section 9, it is not necessary to strictly apply all the requirements which are applicable while passing an order of attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The powers under Section 9 are wider. The object behind conferring such power is to ensure that the arbitral award does not remain on paper because assets are no longer available. 

While exercising jurisdiction under Section 9, the Court is concerned with preserving the effectiveness of the arbitral proceedings. Therefore, while examining such an application, the Court is required to consider the surrounding circumstances placed before it. It is not expected to reject the application because technical requirement of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 has not been pleaded. If the facts justify grant of interim protection, relief should not be denied because the pleadings are not drafted in the same manner as an application for attachment before judgment.

The expression "a strong possibility of diminution of assets would suffice" does not mean that the applicant must prove that the respondent has dishonestly transferred or concealed its assets. At the same time, every apprehension expressed by the claimant cannot be accepted. What is required is that the surrounding facts should indicate that the respondent's assets are likely to become less in value or may not remain available by the time the arbitral award is to be enforced. If such circumstances are shown, the Court may exercise powers under Section 9 even before the assets are transferred.

In commercial matters, assets may become unavailable for different reasons. A business may suffer losses. Valuable properties may become charged in favour of financial institutions. Amounts receivable from customers may be transferred to somebody. Fresh liabilities may be created over existing assets. Although these circumstances may not by itself establish any dishonest conduct, they may still reduce the assets which would otherwise remain available for satisfaction of the arbitral award.

Section 9 is preventive in its object. The Court is expected to intervene before the situation becomes irreversible. If the Court waits until the respondent has disposed of all its assets, then the purpose behind granting interim protection may fail. Since dishonest intention is difficult to establish by direct evidence, the Court is entitled to examine the surrounding circumstances and arrive at a conclusion whether there exists a real likelihood that the respondent's assets may diminish before the arbitral award becomes capable of enforcement. 

Case reference is Norvic Shipping Asia PTE Limited v Zigma International [2026] GCtR 407 (Bombay).

Income-tax and Law : AO's Draft Assessment Orders Held to be Invalid and Without Jurisdiction

Income-tax and Law : AO's Draft Assessment Orders Held to be Invalid and Without Jurisdiction

It has been held that the requirement of issuance of notice u/s. 16(2) of the Wealth Tax Act, which is akin to section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is mandatory in a case of reopening of assessment to assess escaped wealth. 

Issuance of notice u/s.143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is mandatory in case of reopening of assessment u/s. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or for that matter, section 158BC of the Act or any other reassessment proceedings.

Accordingly so-called draft assessment orders passed by the AO were held to be invalid and without jurisdiction. 

Case reference is Global Cricket Corporation Pte. Ltd v ADIT [2026] GCtR 406 (ITAT, Mumbai)

GST and Indirect Tax : High Court Allows Assessee's Petition on Rectification of GSTR-1 Statement

GST and Indirect Tax : High Court Allows Assessee's Petition on Rectification of GSTR-1 Statement

In a recent decision, assessee "Z" has been able to obtain the relief against GST Department. 

The subject matter of the case was regarding permission to  rectify the uploaded GSTR 1 statement in GST portal for the periods August, 2017, November, 2017, December, 2017 and January, 2018 regarding input tax credit. 

One can note that "Form GSTR-1 is a monthly/quarterly Statement of Outward Supplies to be furnished by all normal and casual registered taxpayers making outward supplies of goods and services or both and contains details of outward supplies of goods and services. Every registered taxable person, other than an input service distributor/ composition taxpayer/ persons liable to deduct tax u/s 51 / persons liable to collect tax u/s 52 is required to file Form GSTR-1, the details of outward supplies of goods and/or services during a tax period, electronically on the GST Portal." [Refer https://tutorial.gst.gov.in/userguide/returns/GSTR_1.htm] 

The rectification petition filed by Z was rejected by the authority concerned citing delay and absence of provision to entertain rectification. 

High Court directed the Department to permit the Z to upload the rectified GSTR 1 statement within a period of four weeks.

It was held that right to correct mistakes in the nature of clerical or arithmetical error is a right that flows from right to do business and should not be denied unless there is a good justification and reason to deny benefit of correction. Software limitation itself cannot be a good justification, as software are meant to ease compliance and can be configured. 

Case reference is Assistant Commissioner of CGST and Central Excise v. Akshaya Building Solution [2026] GCtR 390 (Madras). 

Despite Testimony of Injured Witness, High Court Acquits the Accused from Charges of Murder

Despite Testimony of Injured Witness, High Court Acquits the Accused from Charges of Murder

In a recent case where accused was convicted by Trial Court, HC has acquitted the accused from charges of murder. 

The case was of murder of a man Z.

In this case, in her statement, PW-5/Usha stated that she was working as a nurse in Safdarjung Hospital and was on visiting terms with the deceased. On 01.12.1983, she along with her friend PW-7/Alka had gone to Lajpat Nagar with the deceased, who was also accompanied by his two friends, PW-11/Ashok and PW-6/Naginder Kumar. They all took food and then boarded the bus route No.431 for Safdarjung. While she and PW-7/Alka sat on the ladies seat in the bus on the left hand side, the deceased sat on the side seat. Meanwhile, three persons standing on the side of the driver started talking to each other by pointing out towards them and thereafter all three of them came near their seat and started misbehaving with them. The deceased told them to behave, upon which one of those three persons took out a knife and stabbed the deceased on the back. That person proceeded towards them and when PW-5/Usha protested, the said person attacked her also with the knife and she received a scratch on left side of her chin.

As far as the law concerning TIP is concerned, it is no longer res integra that, prior to the TIP being conducted, an accused person must not be shown to the witnesses. If an accused person is shown to witnesses at any prior point of time, not only is the TIP inadmissible, even the subsequent dock identification of such an accused by witnesses is inconsequential. 

No adverse inference can be drawn against accused persons for non-participation in TIP proceedings in scenarios wherein the authenticity of the proceedings themselves are under serious doubt.

It was held that exhortation, in the very nature of things, is a weak piece of evidence.

It was also noted that the use of the words "Maro Sale Ko" cannot by themselves imply the intention to kill.

It was held that to attract the provisions of Section 34 of the IPC, it must be proved that: (i) there was common intention on the part of several persons to commit a particular crime; and (ii) the crime was actually committed by them in furtherance of that common intention. Additionally, exhortation on its own is treated as a weak piece of evidence as there may exist tendencies to implicate some persons in addition to the actual assailants, by attributing to such persons a role of an exhortation to the assailant to assault the victim. Unless the evidence in this respect is clear, cogent and reliable, no conviction for abetment can be recorded against the person alleged to have exhorted to the actual assailant.

Accused was ultimately acquitted.

Case reference is Mukesh Kumar v. State of NCTD [2026] GCtR 389 (Delhi)

Performance of Contract and Section 56 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 : High Court Explains the Principles in its Recent Judgment

Performance of Contract and Section 56 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 : High Court Explains the Principles in its Recent Judgment

One cannot have an agreement to mine coal from the Coal Block when the Supreme Court has outlawed the allocation of the Coal Block. Therefore, the CMSA became impossible to perform upon the cancellation of allocation by the Supreme Court. Thereby, the CMSA became void within the scope of Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. However, to attract the element of compensation in relation to any promise that has become impossible to perform, as provided for under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 the necessary ingredients are that the promisor knew and the promisee did not know, that the promise was impossible to perform. If such ingredients are met, the promisor must make compensation to the promisee for any loss sustained through the non-performance of the promise.  

Therefore, necessarily, to invoke Section 56, the promise in question ought to have been spelt out. Then the knowledge of the promisor that the promise was an impossibility, and the absence of knowledge of the promisee about the impossibility must be shown. It is then that a case for compensation would be made out. Moreover, the very fact that Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act provides for compensation for any loss sustained, there would be a need to assess the loss sustained and a fair assessment of how to compensate for such loss. The aforesaid standard would necessitate examining evidence and assessing what the parties contracted and what the promisor knew about the impossibility or illegality of performance and what the promisee did not know about such impossibility or illegality. Likewise, evidence of loss suffered would need to be led and the compensation amount would have to be arrived at based on empirical evidence. 

Indeed, an interim arbitral award may be made in respect of any matter when nothing further is needed to be done to hold up judgement on that issue. In other words, other elements of the arbitration proceedings would not need to delay pronouncement upon a matter on which the Arbitral Tribunal is convinced and has formed judgement. However, that does not mean that the judgement formed in this process does not have to withstand the scrutiny to which any arbitral award would be subjected. 

Refer Mahaguj Collieries Ltd v. Adani Enterprises Ltd [2026] GCtR 388 (Bombay). 

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Compensation : Supreme Court Enhances the Compensation Amount to Victim of Road Accident

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Compensation : Supreme Court Enhances the Compensation Amount to Victim of Road Accident

It has been held that "though the physical disability may be assessed at a particular percentage, the functional disability affecting earning capacity may, depending upon the nature of avocation carried on by the injured, be assessed at a higher percentage including 100%. The assessment of compensation in cases of permanent disability cannot be undertaken by mechanically applying the percentage of physical disability as the percentage of economic loss."

Refer M Paramesh v. VRL Logistics Ltd [2026] GCtR 386 (SC).

Income Tax Act, 1961 : Assessee's Appeal Allowed and Additions Made to Income Directed to be Deleted

Income Tax Act, 1961 : Assessee's Appeal Allowed and Additions Made to Income Directed to be Deleted

In a recent decision, it was seen that the impugned disallowance of Rs.1,32,01,934/- was made by the Ld. AO on a purely ad hoc basis by disallowing 5% of the alleged direct expenses, primarily on the ground that certain details relating to scrap generation, production data, and consumption records were not furnished during the assessment proceedings. However, no specific defect in the books of account was pointed out, nor was the books rejected under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Further, no instance of inflation of expenditure, suppression of scrap sales, or unverifiable claim was brought on record by the Ld. AO. 

There was merit in the contention of the assessee that the Ld. AO had proceeded on incorrect figures while computing the disallowance. The assessee also demonstrated that the direct expenses considered by the Ld. AO were factually erroneous. Moreover, the assessee had maintained regular books of account, which were produced before the Ld. AO and formed the basis of the assessment itself. The disallowance was made merely on suspicion and surmises without any cogent material establishing that the expenditure claimed was excessive, non-genuine, or not incurred wholly and exclusively for business purposes. 

It was also noted that the revenue has failed to place any material on record to substantiate the allegation that additional evidence had been filed before the first appellate authority so as to attract the provisions of Rule 46A. The assessee has consistently maintained that no fresh evidence was furnished either before the Ld. CIT(A) or before the Tribunal. In the absence of any contrary material, the very foundation of the remand proceedings stands weakened.

Considering the overall facts, the substantial profitability disclosed by the assessee, the absence of any defect in the books of account, and the purely ad hoc nature of the disallowance, the addition cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the disallowance of Rs.1,32,01,934/- was directed to be deleted. 

Case reference is CIE Automotive India Pvt Ltd v. DCIT [2026] GCtR 385 (ITAT, Delhi).

Income Tax and Loans : Applicability of S.68 of Income-tax Act, 1961 Explained in a Recent Decision of June 2026

Income Tax and Loans : Applicability of Section 68 of Income-tax Act, 1961 Explained in a Recent Decision of June 2026

In a recent decision, it was "observed that assessee has filed the certificate of incorporation, PAN Nos, financial statements and the bank statements of the lender companies and thus has duly discharged the burden casted upon it u/s 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 of establishing the identity, creditworthiness of the lender companies and since the loans were taken through banking channels, the genuineness is also established. It is observed that both the loans were repaid in subsequent assessment year where no doubts were raised by the revenue. Once the assessee has established that the lender company has sufficient creditworthiness which was never in dispute merely on assumption that there were circular transactions, addition cannot be made." 

CIT(A) has deleted the addition by observing that the assessee has furnished comprehensive evidence as stated above, to establish the identity and creditworthiness and genuineness of the creditors and transactions. CIT(A) has further observed that the loans were repaid and additions were made on mere suspicion and on conjecture without any direct or corroborative evidence to demonstrate that the loans taken were bogus or represent undisclosed income. 

Accordingly, assessee was able to obtain relief. Case reference is Cinflex Infotech Pvt Ltd v. ACIT [2026] GCtR 383 (ITAT, Delhi). 

Indirect Tax and GST : Law on Composite Show Cause Notices by Tax Department Answered by High Court in a Recent Judgment passed in June 2026

Indirect Tax and GST : Law on Composite Show Cause Notices by Tax Department Answered by High Court in a Recent Judgment passed in June 2026

In a recent Judgment, a writ petition was submitted by the petitioner challenging composite Show Cause Notice which was issued by the respondents for multiple financial years namely, 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 and Ext.P2 Order-in-Original. The main challenge raised against the sustainability of the same is that, issuance of a composite notice for multiple assessment years was found to be not legally sustainable.

The writ petition was allowed and direction was issued to issue separate show cause notice.

Case reference is Malabar Trade Links v. Superintendent [2026] GCtR 382 (Kerala).

One can also refer Joint Commissioner v. Lakshmi Mobile Accessories [2025] GCtR 869 (Kerala). 

In said case after looking at S.74 of CGST Act, 2017 it was noted as follows : 

"If a consolidated notice for various financial/assessment years is issued, the total amount of tax, penalty etc. determined as payable by the assessee may increase exponentially depending upon the number of financial/assessment years included in the consolidated notice. The determination of tax, penalty etc. would be in respect of all the financial/assessment years put together. That would go against the provisions of sub sections (9) and (10) of Section 74 which specifically refer to the “financial year to which the tax not paid or short paid or input tax credit wrongly availed or utilised relates” while stipulating the last date for passing the adjudication order." 

"A consolidated notice would also result in a consolidated adjudication order covering several financial/assessment years and in the event of it being adverse to the assessee, the fee/pre- deposit required to be paid by an assessee for preferring a statutory appeal would also be higher." 

"This could not have been the Scheme of the statutory provisions which are expected to adhere to principles of fairness in taxation."

"Under Section 74 of the CGST Act, 2017 the end termini for adjudication varies for each financial/assessment year, since it is not pegged to the date of the show cause notice but to a period of five years from the due date for furnishing of annual return for the financial year to which the tax not paid or short paid or input tax credit wrongly availed or utilised relates to. Issuing a consolidated show cause notice covering various financial/assessment years would cause prejudice to an assessee who would not get the full period envisaged for adjudication under the Statute, if that period is circumscribed by the limitation period prescribed in relation to an earlier financial/assessment year."

Indirect Tax and GST : Law on Cross- Examination in Cases involving ITC Answered by HC in a Recent Judgment passed in June 2026

Indirect Tax and GST : Law on Cross- Examination in Cases involving ITC Answered by HC in a Recent Judgment passed in June 2026

It has been held that in quasi-judicial proceedings, the right of cross-examination is not absolute. 

It was noted that in the case at hand, the allegation against the respective petitioner was that ITC was availed without a genuine supply being made. High Court said that this could have been countered by filing an appropriate reply enclosing documents such as invoices, e-way bills, transportation receipts and the like. In this factual context, mere denial of right of cross-examination does not vitiate proceedings against the respective petitioner. 

High Court therefore refused to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under A.226.

However, option of filing appeal was left open. 

Case reference is MNS Enterprise v. Additional Commissioner of GST And Central Excise [2026] GCtR 381 (Madras).

Indirect Tax and GST : Legal Principles of Investigation by Department and Rights of Assessee Explained in a Recent Judgment of June 2026

Indirect Tax and GST : Legal Principles of Investigation by Department and Rights of Assessee Explained in a Recent Judgment of June 2026

In a recent judgment it has been held that the gravity of the economic offences, which impact the financial health of the country, can never be underestimated and has been vociferously emphasized. Case was related to e-way bills, non filing of returns and S.70 and S.174 of CGST Act, 2017.

Whenever the GST Department has reason to believe that any fraud is being committed by a Company, it has the statutory right to conduct an investigation and, upon detection of any fraud, to proceed against the persons responsible in accordance with law.

It was noted that considering that there was no imminent threat of arrest and, therefore, no case for anticipatory bail was made out, the learned ASJ, in his wisdom, while dismissing the Anticipatory Bail Applications, had merely directed that seven days' prior notice be given before taking any coercive action, which is in consonance with the principles of natural justice and affords the assessee an opportunity to avail their remedies in accordance with law, in the event of any apprehension of arrest.

To conclude, no blanket protection has been granted to the assessee; rather, specific directions have been issued requiring them to join the investigation, in accordance with law. It is only seven days' prior notice that has been directed to be given to the Respondents by the Petitioner in the event that any coercive step is proposed to be taken by the Petitioner in the present matter, which cannot be held to be a blanket protection against all crimes, in future.

Case reference is DGGSTI v. Girish Sachdeva [2026] GCtR 379 (Delhi)

Delay in Filing Income Tax Returns : High Court Explains the Legal Position

Delay in Filing Income Tax Returns : High Court Explains the Legal Position 

It has been held that Chapter VI-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, deals with deductions to be made in computing the total income. Under Section 80P of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in the case of an assessee being a Cooperative Society, if the gross total income includes any one of the incomes referred to in sub-section (2), the same shall be deducted in accordance with sub-section (2) in computing the total income of the assessee. Under sub-section (2), with reference to Cooperative Societies, many of its activities mentioned therein, such as carrying on the business of banking, providing credit facilities, cottage industry, marketing of agricultural produce grown by its members, purchasing agricultural implements, seeds, livestock or other articles, processing of agricultural produce without the aid of power, collective disposal of labour of its members, fishing or allied activities, etc., are eligible to be deducted. The whole amount of profits and gains of business attributable to any one or more of such activities is to be deducted. Similarly, various other activities of Cooperative Societies, including consumer Cooperative Societies, income from interest, income from letting out godowns, warehouses, etc., and several other types of activities can also be deducted.

It must be recognized that the Cooperative movement itself is in the public interest, as it is necessary for driving inclusive socio-economic growth, particularly in rural and economically underdeveloped areas. The Cooperative movement’s importance lies in providing micro-credits and financial assistance to farmers and in promoting the marketing of their products, thereby ensuring socioeconomic equality.

Parliament has enacted Section 80 P of the Income-tax Act, 1961, granting deductions in respect of the said activities of the Cooperative Societies. The denial of the same, solely because there is a delay in filing the returns, should be considered a procedural aspect pitted against the substantive entitlement. 

Wherever the assessment orders are passed and no appeals are filed, it will be open for the Cooperative Societies to file appeals, along with condonation of delay in filing the appeal, as the case may be. The delay shall be condoned, and the appellate authority shall treat the delay in filing the returns as condoned by the respective Chief Commissioner of Income Tax under the circulars.

Citation : T943 Vickrapandiyam Primary Agricultural Co-operative Credit Society Ltd v CCIT [2026] GCtR 378 (Madurai, Madras)

 

Property Law and Concepts Explained by Supreme Court

Property Law and Concepts Explained by Supreme Court

In a joint tenancy, all co-owners together constitute ownership. It is governed by the rule of survivorship. When one joint tenant dies, his interest automatically accrues to the surviving co-owners, and not on his own progeny. What this means is that while the joint tenancy subsists, none of the co-owners have a separate inheritable share. For instance, suppose ‘A’ and ‘B’ jointly hold a property under the Mitakshara system, if ‘A’ dies, ‘B’ automatically absorbs ‘A’s interest by survivorship. There is no question of it devolving upon ‘A’s widow or children. Ownership, therefore, continues in the surviving coparcener without any separate succession taking place. 

On the other hand, in tenancy-in-common, each co-owner possesses a distinct, undivided share in the property. Physical possession may remain joint, the ownership of each individual coowner is identifiable and notionally separate. Survivorship has no place in this form of devolution. Upon the death of one co-owner, his share devolves upon his own heirs according to the law of succession. To illustrate, suppose ‘A’ dies intestate leaving behind ‘B’ and ‘C’ as his heirs,under Section 8 read with Section 19 of the HSA, ‘B’ and ‘C’ inherit the property as tenants-in-common. Each acquires a definite share. If ‘B’ later dies, ‘B’s share will devolve upon ‘B’s own legal heirs and will not automatically pass to ‘C’. The difference in the two systems determines the nature of property inherited by a son from his father.

Citation : Darubai v. Kamalabai [2026] GCtR 376 (SC) 

Criminal Law and the Acquittal of Accused For "Dowry Death" under S. 304B of IPC

Criminal Law and the Acquittal of Accused For "Dowry Death" under S. 304B of IPC 

There are many cases where websites or media outlets and even prosecution fees that someone has committed a crime under S.304B of IPC. However, that does not mean that such views of websites/media outlets/prosecution would lead to a conclusion that such person who is portrayed as such in media is an actual criminal.

In case of Major Singh v. State of Punjab [2015] GCtR 6676 (SC) accused was acquitted of offence under S.304B of IPC.

This case involved allegations of harassment in connection with dowry ; in that case, father of victim even alleged that he saw accused are dragging the victim after giving poison ; the victim had died due to poisoning. The accused argued that brother and father of victim are interested witness and therefore, unreliable ; ultimately, accused persons were able to secure acquittal. 

Criminal Law and Methods to Secure Acquittal in Cases of Dowry Death of Bride and Abetment to Suicide

Criminal Law and Methods to Secure Acquittal in Cases of Dowry Death of Bride and Abetment to Suicide

In a case where in the Post Mortem Report the cause of death was opined as “Asphyxia as a result of compression of the neck by a ligature” and in the subsequent opinion the Doctor opined that it could not be determined whether the death was suicidal or homicidal. Court concluded that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the respondents.  Admittedly, no complaint was ever made to the police or to any other Authority or person about the alleged harassment of the deceased. In this case, PW15 Dr. Meghali Kelker had recorded in the Post Mortem Report Ex.PW15/A that there were as many as six external injuries. Accused were held entitled to acquittal.  - State v. Dheeraj Sharma [2023] GCtR 2543 (Delhi)

Criminal Law : Legal Principles of Custody and Surrender of Accused Prior to Conviction

Criminal Law : Legal Principles of Custody and Surrender of Accused Prior to Conviction

In an interesting case issue of surrender of accused was discussed. Recently, an FIR was lodged at Bhopal but accused tried to surrender in Jabalpur ; however, Magistrate at Jabalpur has refused to allow the accused to surrender.

The law was explained in Ayyappan v. State [2015] GCtR 6673 (Madurai, Madras).

It will be appropriate, at this stage, to note that in every arrest, there is custody but not vice versa and that both the words 'custody' and 'arrest' are not synonymous terms. 

He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before a Magistrate and gets a remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when he surrenders before the court and submits to its directions.

 It is crystal clear that an accused, by surrendering before a Magistrate, gets into the custody of the Magistrate and thereafter, the Magistrate concerned has to deal with him under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is also crystal clear that such Magistrate before whom the accused surrenders need not be the one having territorial jurisdiction either to try or commit the case for trial. Irrespective of the fact whether he has territorial jurisdiction to try the case or to commit it to the court of session for trial, if the accused, in connection with any case under investigation, surrenders before a Magistrate on his own, the Magistrate has no discretion to refuse to accept the surrender of the accused before him for any reason.

Criminal Law and False Cases of Bride's Death and S.304B of IPC

Criminal Law and False Cases of Bride's Death and Section 304B of IPC

In an important Judgment the falsity of a case under S.304B of IPC was highlighted. Accused was ultimately acquitted.

In that case allegations were that accused persons used to torment victim. It was also alleged that there were letters written by victim regarding torture. In this case there was delay in FIR. The records of treatment of victim was also produced by accused. 

Delay in institution of the case play vital role, more particularly, when it is found not at all explained. If an omission or discrepancy goes to the root of the matter and ushers in incongruities, the defence can take advantage of such inconsistencies.

Case : Mala v. State of Bihar [2018] GCtR 6671 (Patna)

Twisha Sharma's Death and Legal Principles of Abetment of Suicide

Twisha Sharma's Death and Legal Principles of Abetment of Suicide

The news around death of Twish Sharma is now turning controversial. In an important judgment, issue of  S.107 of IPC and S.306 of IPC was discussed.

It was held that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. The act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive language will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide. Unless the ingredients of instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied, accused cannot be convicted under Section 306 I.P.C. In order to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible with regard to determining the culpability.

In the case of suicide, mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless there be such action on the part of the accused which compels the person to commit suicide; and such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. If the persons who committed suicide had been hypersensitive and the action of accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly circumstanced person to commit suicide, it may not be safe to hold the accused guilty of abetment of suicide.

If the acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accused intended nothing more than harassment or snap show of anger, a particular case may fall short of the offence of abetment of suicide. 

Not only there has to be evidence of continuous harassment, but there should be cogent evidence to establish a positive action by the accused which should more or less be proximate to the time of occurrence, which action can said to have led or compelled the person to commit suicide.

It was noted in that Judgment that "further, the allegations made by PW-1 to PW-3 in their statement with respect to continuous harassment and torture of the deceased by the appellants just after the marriage is not worthy of being relied upon and has to be taken with a pinch of salt on account of fact that throughout their 9 years of marriage, there has never been any complaint or a whisper in this regard either by the deceased or her family members who appeared as prosecution witnesses. Even the deceased herself who was a qualified doctor never made any complaint in this regard." 

Merely on the allegation of harassment without their being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. 

Case : Mariano Anto Bruno v. Inspector of Police [2022] GCtR 2015 (SC)

Criminal Law : Important Judgments of May 2026

Criminal Law : Important Judgments of May 2026

Written in Memory of Late Shri R.P. Mishra, Prayagraj

1. In case of Jagabandhu Jena v. State of NCTD [2026] GCtR 366 (Delhi) it was held that "where the case rests solely upon the oral testimony of the prosecutrix, the court must subject such evidence to careful scrutiny, and if reasonable doubt arises as to its reliability on material particulars, the benefit thereof must go to the accused".  It was was explained that while "it is true that PW1 has not mentioned certain fact either in her FIS/FIR or in her testimony before the court. However, this omission is not of such a nature so as to demolish the prosecution case especially when PW1 withstood the cross-examination."

2. In case of Kommineni Ajay Babu v. State of NCTD [2026] GCtR 367 (Delhi), it was held that in cases of large scale cyber frauds and even other economic offences, grant of anticipatory bail is not appropriate because doing so would thwart and derail the investigation. It was noted that the legal character of the relationship between the accused/applicant and Smartplan Media Pvt. Ltd. also needs to be unearthed, because the said entity is a private limited company, but the accused/applicant claims himself to be a “proprietor” thereof, which is not a coherent statement.

3. In the case of Raj Mahato v. State of NCTD [2026] GCtR 368 (Delhi), even in cases of alleged offences under the POCSO Act, 2012 the Court does exercise discretion to grant bail in appropriate cases. While consent is legally irrelevant in cases involving offences under the POCSO Act, Court has thus recognised that relationships among young adults, where there may have been de facto approval of both participants for a sexual relationship, however misguided, must be treated on a different footing.

4. In case of Brijesh Kothia v. State of NCTD [2026] GCtR 369 (Delhi), though illegality in arrest and remand warrants that an arrestee be released from custody, it does not by itself nullify the investigation or bar further action in accordance with law.  Non‑supply of written grounds of arrest within the stipulated window vitiates the arrest and the remand, irrespective of the statute under which the arrest is made, though without invalidating the investigation or the trial. It was held that there is a clear distinction between generic “reasons for arrest” as routinely recorded in arrest memos and “grounds of arrest” which are personal and specific to the accused; observing that the former cannot be treated as a substitute for the latter.

5. In the case of Heera Lal v. State of NCTD [2026] GCtR 370 (Delhi), the accused was acquitted. It is settled law that where a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, each link of the evidence must lead only to the culpability of the accused. Circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established and should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused; they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved and should not leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused. In this case, the "alleged recoveries, even otherwise, do not take the case of the prosecution any further. As far as the shirt and pants stated to be of the appellant Heera Lal are concerned, no blood could be detected on them. As far as the shirt alleged to be belonging to the appellant Surender is concerned, though blood was detected on it and was stated to be of human origin, the blood group could not be conclusively stated. Even otherwise, whether the shirt at all belonged to accused has not been proved by the prosecution, except only through the statement of accused2 Heera Lal, which would be inadmissible as against Surender (accused 1) . As far as the knife is concerned, again, no blood was detected on it."

6. In the case of Nirmal Kumar v. State of NCTD [2026] GCtR 371 (Delhi), it was held that there is a distinction between “taking” and merely allowing a minor to accompany a person. Where a minor, having sufficient understanding, voluntarily leaves the protection of her guardian and joins the accused, it cannot be said that the accused has “taken” her, unless there is clear evidence of inducement or active participation in forming such intention. In this case, it was seen that there does not appear to be any specific act of inducement or active role on the part of the accused in causing PW1 to leave her lawful guardian’s custody. In fact the case of PW1 is that she loved the appellant/ accused, but later on she realised that he was already married and hence a cheat. Apart from the version of PW1, there are no materials to show that the accused was in fact a married man when PW1 eloped with him. It was held that the essential ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of IPC have not been satisfactorily established. Accordingly, the trial court went wrong in convicting the appellant/accused for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of IPC.

7. In the case of CCL S v. State of NCTD [2026] GCtR 372 (Delhi), it was held that the court cannot be oblivious of harsh reality of today’s society where a number of heinous crimes even under special legislations like NDPS Act and MCOCA are being committed by the organized syndicates through juveniles, abusing the social welfare legislation.In the present case itself, there were five assailants as alleged by prosecution. Besides that, the CCL/applicant was involved in two more cases of serious nature, one of which is another murder case and it is while on bail in that murder case, the CCL/applicant got involved in the present murder case. The apprehension expressed by the State is not vague that if released on bail, the CCL/applicant would come in contact with some known criminals. The murder in which the CCL/applicant is alleged to be involved took place while he was already on bail in yet another murder case, in addition to which he is involved in yet another serious crime. Ultimately, bail was denied to accused.

8. In the case of Sunil @ Sunil Sharma v. DRI [2026] GCtR 373 (Delhi), it was concluded that inventory prepared was not in accordance with Sub section (2) of Section 52A of the NDPS Act, 1985. It was held that the provisions of the NDPS Act, 1985 and the punishments prescribed therein are stringent, the extent of burden to prove the foundational facts cast on the prosecution, is more onerous. The courts would have to undertake a heightened scrutiny test and satisfy itself of "proof beyond all reasonable doubt". It was then noted that Section 52(3)(b) of the NDPS Act, 1985 clearly says that the article seized shall be forwarded without unnecessary delay to the officer empowered under Section 53 of NDPS Act, 1985. Therefore, it was incumbent on PW9 to hand over the case property/material objects without any delay to PW10, the officer empowered under Section 53. However, there are no materials to show that it was in fact handed over by PW9 to PW10 on 18.05.2012 itself.

9. It is held in Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat [2026] GCtR 374 (SC) that "when a person executes a document claiming property as his own, there is no making of a false document merely because the claim is ultimately found to be incorrect. To constitute the offence of cheating, there must exist deception, fraudulent inducement and consequential delivery of property coupled with dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction."

10. It is held in Papan Sarkar @ Pranab v. State of WB [2026] GCtR 375 (SC) that in this case, the absence of motive, especially when the murder was brutal, is yet another aspect raising a reasonable doubt. On the point of recovery, it was noted that "the recoveries are of no avail and do not form a clinching incriminating circumstance against the accused." It was noted that recital in the seizure list is only that ‘on being shown and certified by accused 1 and 2’. Concealment and its knowledge, revealed from the statement of the accused, is the crucial ingredient of Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which can lead to that being used in a criminal trial, any other confession to a police officer being excluded as self-incriminating. 

Termination of Employee and Principles of Compensation Explained in a Recent Judgment of May 2026

Termination of Employee and Principles of Compensation Explained in a Recent Judgment of May 2026

"Once the termination is found unsustained and the employer fails to rebut the plea of unemployment, the workman cannot be left with a compensation which is hardly proportionate to even a few months of salary." 

Citation : Raghunath Shivram Naikade v. Patil Construction and Infrastructure Ltd [2026] GCtR 364 (Bombay)

Disciplinary Action against Employees and Legal Principles Explained by Supreme Court in its Recent Judgment of May 2026

Disciplinary Action against Employees and Legal Principles Explained by Supreme Court in its Recent Judgment of May 2026

It is well settled that a member of the police force is expected to maintain the highest degree of integrity, honesty and discipline. Fraud at the threshold of entry into service strikes at the very root of public employment. The law is settled that the findings of fact recorded by the disciplinary authority are not to be interfered with by the Court as a matter of course, particularly while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In departmental proceedings, the standard of proof is one of preponderance of probabilities. Where the material on record reasonably supports the departmental case, the High Court would not reappreciate the evidence as if sitting in appeal.

Citation : State of Jharkhand v. Ranjan Kumar [2026] GCtR 363 (SC)

Law on Compensation for Land Acquisition Explained by Supreme Court

Law on Compensation for Land Acquisition Explained by Supreme Court

Where sale deeds pertaining to different transactions are relied on behalf of the Government, that representing the highest value should be preferred to the rest unless there are strong circumstances justifying a different course. In any case we see no reason why an average of two sale deeds should have been taken 

Method of working out the ‘average price’ paid under different sale transactions is not proper and that one should not have, ordinarily recourse to such method. 

Even where there are several exemplars with reference to similar lands, usually the highest of the exemplars, which is a bona fide transaction, will be considered. 

It is clear that when there are several exemplars with reference to similar lands, it is the general rule that the highest of the exemplars, if it is satisfied, that it is a bona fide transaction has to be considered and accepted. When the land is being compulsorily taken away from a person, he is entitled to the highest value which similar land in the locality is shown to have fetched in a bona fide transaction entered into between a willing purchaser and a willing seller near about the time of the acquisition. In our view, it seems to be only fair that where sale deeds pertaining to different transactions are relied on behalf of the Government, the transaction representing the highest value should be preferred to the rest unless there are strong circumstances justifying a different course. 

Mehrawal Khewaji Trust v. State of Punjab [2012] GCtR 6667 (SC)

Evidence in a Claim in Arbitral Proceedings : Supreme Court Explains the Principles

Evidence in a Claim in Arbitral Proceedings : Supreme Court Explains the Principles

"While the quantum of evidence required to accept a claim, may be a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitrator to decide, if there was no evidence at all and if the arbitrator makes an award of the amount claimed in the claim statement, merely on the basis of the claim statement without anything more, it has to be held that the award on that account would be invalid."

Citation : State of Rajasthan v. Ferro Concrete Construction Pvt Ltd [2009] GCtR 6039 (SC)

Partition of Property and The Legal Principles to be Applied

Partition of Property and The Legal Principles to be Applied

In a recent judgment, important principles on property was discussed.

Section 16 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides that subject to pecuniary or other limitations prescribed by any law, suits inter alia for partition of immovable property shall be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate. Proviso thereto provides that suit relating to immovable property may be instituted either in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate or in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the Defendant actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, where the relief sought can be entirely obtained through his personal obedience. There is, however, an Explanation to the Section which provides that ‘property’ means property situate in India.

Prima facie it also emerges from a plain reading of the Explanation to Section 16, which categorically stipulates ‘property’ means property situate in India.

Citation : Samaira Kapur v. Priya Kapur [2026] GCtR 362 Delhi)

False Documents, Evidence and Their Production in Court : Supreme Court Explains the Legal Impact

False Documents, Evidence and Their Production in Court : Supreme Court Explains the Legal Impact 

In an important judgment it is held that it is difficult to interpret Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as containing a bar against initiation of prosecution proceedings merely because the document concerned was produced in a court albeit the act of forgery was perpetrated prior to its production in the Court. Any such construction is likely to ensue unsavoury consequences. For instance, if rank forgery of a valuable document is detected and the forgerer is sure that he would imminently be embroiled in prosecution proceedings he can simply get that document produced in any long-drawn litigation which was either instituted by himself or somebody else who can be influenced by him and thereby pre-empt the prosecution for the entire long period of pendency of that litigation. It is a settled proposition that if the language of a legislation is capable of more than one interpretation, the one which is capable of causing mischievous consequences should be averted. Quoting from Gill v. Donald Humberstone & Co. Ltd.5 Maxwell has stated in his treatise (Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn., p. 105) that “if the language is capable of more than one interpretation we ought to discard the more natural meaning if it leads to unreasonable result and adopt that interpretation which leads to a reasonably practicable result”. The clause which was considered contains enough indication to show that the more natural meaning is that which leans in favour of a strict construction, and hence the aforesaid observation is eminently applicable here.

Scope of Preliminary Enquiry under S.340

The scope of the preliminary enquiry envisaged in Section 340(1) of the Code, 1973 is to ascertain whether any offence affecting administration of justice has been committed in respect of a document produced in court or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court. In other words, the offence should have been committed during the time when the document was in custodia legis.

The sequitur of the above discussion is that the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code, 1973 is not applicable to a case where forgery of the document was committed before the document was produced in a court. 

Forgery of Document

Forgery of a document if committed far outside the precincts of the Court and long before its production in the Court, the same cannot be treated as one affecting administration of justice. Section 195(1)(b) (ii) of Code, 1973 would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis.

Documents in Court

Noticing the statutory scheme under Section 195 of Code, 1973 has held that where offences has already been committed earlier and later on the document is produced or given in the evidence in Court, the same is neither covered under Clauses (a), (b)(i) or (b) (ii). 

Case reference is Vishnu Chandru Gaonkar v. N.M. Dessai [2018] GCtR 6666 (SC).

Criminal Law : FSL Reports and Its Role in Criminal Cases Involving Murder

Criminal Law : FSL Reports and Its Role in Criminal Cases Involving Murder

In a recent case, role of FSL report was brought forth. The case was related to S.302 of IPC.

In this case, it was noted that the case "is not a case of direct evidence."  In this case, it was alleged that on thumb of the present accused/applicant, one bite mark was detected and the same was found to contain saliva of the deceased, which connects him with aggressive sex that led to death of the deceased. CCTV footage depicting the four accused persons carrying away dead body of the deceased in a bag.

As regards circumstantial evidence also, there is no witness who had seen the deceased last alive with any of the accused persons. Even according to prosecution case, the alleged sexual activity between the deceased and the four accused persons took place inside the room. That being so, the possible evidence connecting the accused/applicant with the so called aggressive sex, could have been obtained through forensic examination. But, according to FSL, no sexual activity was detected on examination of the dead body. 

In other words, even if prosecution version is assumed to be correct to the effect that the accused persons engaged services of the deceased for sex and one of them carried out aggressive sex, which turned fatal for the deceased, it cannot be said as to which of the four accused persons was responsible for that. 

Merely because of the deceased’s bite mark on thumb of the present accused/applicant, it cannot be said that it is the accused/applicant only who carried out the aggressive sex, which turned out to be fatal. 

Accused was held entitled to bail.

Citation : Ram Nath v. State NCTD [2026] GCtR 361 (Delhi)

Civil Suits and Ways and Means For Quicker Disposal of Civil Suits

Civil Suits and Ways and Means For Quicker Disposal of Civil Suits

In a recent case, issue was related to Order VIII Rule 1 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the condonation of delay in filing the written statement.

It was held thus :

"It had become a tendency of the defendants to prolong the trial of the case and to drag the proceedings as long as possible, since prolonging of the proceedings itself results in defeating justice. In order to curb this tendency, amendments were made in Civil Procedure Code and while the written statement should be filed within 30 days, extension of time for filing written statement beyond 30 days but within 90 days should be given if reasonable grounds are shown by the defendant and the Court is satisfied with those grounds. Beyond 90 days, the Court is not powerless in extending the time for filing written statement but this discretion must be exercised only in exceptional cases so that the procedure does not defeat the substantive justice."

Order 7 Rule 11 proceedings are independent of the filing of a WS, and that the liberty to file an application for rejection u/o 7 Rule 11  cannot be made as a ruse fore retrieving the lost opportunity to file the WS.

The Order through which the application to condone the delay was dismissed was found to be valid and proper.

Citation : Amulaya Chawla v. Anil Kumar Gupta [2026] GCtR 359 (Delhi)

Family Law : Whether an Educated Wife can claim Maintenance From Husband ?

Family Law : Whether an Educated Wife can claim Maintenance From Husband ?

In a recent case, wife filed appeal.

The divorce petition has been filed by the respondent-husband. The wife is M.D. (Gynaecologist) and the respondent-husband is Neurosurgeon. Both are residents of Prayagraj. 

The wife was aggrieved by the impugned order dated 07.04.2025 by which an application for maintenance filed by the wife and the three children under Sections 24 and 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 has been rejected in part. The application of the wife under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 has been dismissed, however application under Section 26 for maintenance of the children has been allowed and undisputedly, the respondent is paying Rs.60,000/- per month towards their maintenance. 

Learned counsel for the husband on the other hand submits that the respondent has faithfully been paying the maintenance amount of Rs.60,000/- per month to the children without demur. He further submits that the wife is a trained specialized Gynecologist who could earn more than the respondent himself in a State like Uttar Pradesh. He further submits that learned trial court has dismissed her application under Section 24 precisely as applicant is more capable of maintaining herself because of her qualification.

HC noted that wife is a Gynecologist and is capable of earning handsomely in her line of expertise.

The contention putforth by wife that she is presently not working is rejected. Where a qualified person is capable of earning more than enough through the use of her expertise and still refrains from doing so only to impose a burden upon her husband, in such a situation the Courts can deny maintenance under Section 24. Therefore, having gone through the order passed by the learned trial court where the application under Section 24 was rejected where the learned trial court has held that the wife was earning handsomely based upon her ITRs which reflected that she was earning more than Rs.31 lakhs per annum.

Case : Dr. Garima Dubey v. Dr. Saurabh Anand Dubey [2026] GCtR 358 (Allahabad)

Cheque Dishonour under S.138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and Method to Rebut Presumption under S.139 of NI Act

Cheque Dishonour under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and Method to Rebut Presumption under S.139 of NI Act

In an important case it was held that though security cheques are per se not shut out from the ambit of Negotiable Instruments Act but they are in the nature of an acceptance of the fact that in case “debt” crystallizes in to existence and becomes “in presenti”, nonetheless the background in which such security cheques are given are of relevance.

In this case accused had successfully rebutted the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, namely, the existence of a legally enforceable debt by establishing that the cheques were never given as security margin and no intimation was given to him about the use of such cheques.

Three Factor Test

For the application of provision of Section 138 of the NI Act, 3 ingredients are required to be satisfied, i.e., 

I. That there should be a legally enforceable debt; 

II. That the cheque should have been drawn from the account of the bank for discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability which pre-supposes a legally enforceable debt; and 

III.That the cheques so issued are dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. 

Holder of Cheque and Presumptions

Under Section 139 of NI Act, unless the contrary is proved, the holder of the cheque shall be presumed to have received the cheque in discharge of any debt or liability. 17. Sub-clause (a) of Section 118 of the NI Act, inter-alia, provides that unless the contrary is proved, the drawn up negotiable instrument, if accepted, has to be presumed to be for consideration. 

Provisions of section 138 to 142 of the NI Act, is for the purpose of giving credibility to negotiable instruments in business transactions. In view of section 139 of the NI Act, it had to be presumed that a cheque is always issued in discharge of any debt or other liability. The presumption could be rebutted by adducing evidence and the burden of proof is on the person who wants to rebut the presumption. 

Debt and Presumption under S.139

Section 139 of the NI Act merely raises a presumption in regard to the cheque having been issued in discharge of any debt or liability but not the existence per se of a legally recoverable debt. 

Section 139 of the NI Act includes the presumption regarding the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability and that the holder of a cheque is also presumed to have received the same in discharge of such debt or liability.

Section 139 of the NI Act, 1881 is stated to be an example of a reverse onus clause which is in tune with the legislative intent of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. Section 138 of the NI Act provides for speedy remedy in a criminal forum, in relation to dishonour of cheques.

Case : Varun Capital Services Ltd v. Rajesh Kumar [2015] GCtR 6664 (Delhi)

GST and Tax : Steps to be Taken Before Issuing Orders which are Adverse to Assessee

GST and Tax : Steps to be Taken Before Issuing Orders which are Adverse to Assessee

Before passing any orders which are adverse to the assessee, the authorities are duty bound to give a hearing to the assessee, and further, the proviso to Rule 92(3) of the CGST Rules, 2017 provides that an opportunity of being heard be provided to the assessee prior to the rejection of the refund claim application.  

Citation : Infinx Services Pvt. Ltd v. Union of India [2026] GCtR 357 (Bombay)

Cheque Dishonour under S.138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and Non-Production of Books of Accounts in Complaints for Cheque-Dishonour

Cheque Dishonour under S.138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and Non-Production of Books of Accounts in Complaints for Cheque-Dishonour

In an interesting case, the Metropolitan Magistrate acquitted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The acquittal was found justified.

Supply of Goods

In this case, petitioner was a proprietorship concern dealing in business of papers and packaging and the accused used to have a running account with the petitioner company for purchasing papers. The accused had placed an order for supply of papers with an assurance of payment on delivery vide invoice dated 29th April 2011 and 30th April 2011 amounting to a total of ₹5,80,598/- and as there was a previous balance of ₹35,983/- on the accused and the petitioner had later purchased paper from the accused for a sum of ₹1,80,611/-, after adjusting the same the liability of the accused towards petitioner as on 30th April 2011 was of ₹4,35,970/-. 

In discharge of that liability the accused issued a cheque bearing number 158770 drawn on Syndicate Bank for a sum of ₹4,35,970/- in favour of the petitioner company. On presentation of the aforesaid cheque, it was dishonoured with remarks ‘Account Closed’ vide return memo dated 19 th September 2011. Legal demand notice was sent to the accused. Despite the service of legal notice, the accused failed to make the payment. Hence, the complaint.

In his defence he claimed that the petitioner had cheated him and he was not liable to pay any amount to the petitioner. He further submitted that he used to supply goods to the petitioner and a sum of ₹2,68,781/- had to be paid by the petitioner to him.

Improper Bills and A Source of Defence for Accused

Statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein he stated that he never bought any paper from the petitioner but used to supply paper to the petitioner and the bills placed by the petitioner are not in order otherwise they would have been countersigned. As regards the cheque the accused stated that the cheque was lost by him of which he had lodged a police complaint in the month of August 2011 and when he received the legal notice it was duly replied by him.

Accused examined himself as DW-1 wherein he reiterated his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. He further stated that he used to sell corrugated papers to the petitioner of which he filed around 15 bills vide Ex.DW-1/A-1 to A-15 having signatures of the petitioner along with stamp. He also stated have the petitioner owed him a sum of ₹2,68,781. He also reproduced his DVAT form from 1st April 2011 to 30th September 2011 vide Ex.DW-1/B and copy of summary of purchase for the month of April, May, August and September 2011 as Ex.CW-1/D-1 to D-4. The accused also produced ledger balance with the petitioner vide Ex.DW-1/E. He also stated that he had replied to the notice of the petitioner and produced a copy of the reply as Mark A and sent notice for recovery of his outstanding amount as Mark B. He also proved his complaint regarding loss of cheque as Ex.DW-1/F. 

Liability and Evidence in Cheque- Dishonour

After perusing the evidence on record, the petitioner has relied on two invoices to show the liability of the accused but none of these two invoices are countersigned by the accused. The ledger of the running account with the accused has not been placed on record by the petitioner. Moreover, the invoices and ledger with respect to the business transactions between the petitioner and the accused that have been relied upon by the accused have not been denied by the petitioner. 

Absence of Countersign

From the material placed on record it was held that it is evident that the petitioner purchased goods from the accused on 15 occasions and kept on paying those in regular intervals leaving a balance of ₹2,68,781 on 24th March 2011. After this the petitioner claimed to have sold goods to the accused on 29th April 2011 and 30th April 2011 through two invoices which are not countersigned by the accused despite that being the usual practice of the petitioner of countersigning the invoices whenever he purchased goods from the accused. The petitioner chose not to produce any book of accounts in support of the invoices filed by him yet admitting the last sale by the respondent and adjustment of ₹35,983/-. 

Case : Swastik Paper and Packaging v. Amit Upadhyaya [2019] GCtR 6663 (Delhi)

Criminal Law and Legal Principles of Genuineness of FIR Explained by Supreme Court

Criminal Law and Legal Principles of Genuineness of FIR Explained by Supreme Court

In a recent case, the issue of genuineness of FIR was discussed.

It was noted thus : "Apparently, thus, the close relatives of the deceased had gone to the police station in the late hours of 19th September itself. If this version was true then, in natural course, these persons were bound to divulge about the incident to the police and their statement/s which would presumably be about an incident of the homicidal death would have mandatorily been entered in the Daily Dairy of the police station if not treated to be the FIR. However, the Daily Diary or the Roznamcha entry of the police station corresponding to the so called visit by the relatives of the deceased to the police station was not brought on record which creates a grave doubt on the genuineness of the FIR". 

Conduct of Family Members

It was observed that "the conduct of the family members of the deceased and the other villagers in not taking any steps to protect the dead body for the whole night and instead, casually going back to their houses without giving a second thought as to what may happen to the mortal remains of the deceased, lying exposed to the elements is another circumstance which creates a grave doubt in the mind of the Court that no one had actually seen the incident and it was a case of blind murder which came to light much later. if at all the sequence of events as emanating from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was having even a grain of truth, then it cannot be believed that the dead body would be abandoned in this manner or that even the police officials would not put a guard at the crime scene."

Law on Disclosure Statement

The statement of an accused recorded by a police officer under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is basically a memorandum of confession of the accused recorded by the Investigating Officer during interrogation which has been taken down in writing. The confessional part of such statement is inadmissible and only the part which distinctly leads to discovery of fact is admissible in evidence.

Thus, when the Investigating Officer steps into the witness box for proving such disclosure statement, he would be required to narrate what the accused stated to him. As per Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 oral evidence in all cases must be direct. The section leaves no ambiguity and mandates that no secondary/hearsay evidence can be given in case of oral evidence, except for the circumstances enumerated in the section. In case of a person who asserts to have heard a fact, only his evidence must be given in respect of the same. 

Can Memorandum prepared by IO has an Effect ?

Mere exhibiting of memorandum prepared by the Investigating Officer during investigation cannot tantamount to proof of its contents. While testifying on oath, the Investigating Officer would be required to narrate the sequence of events which transpired leading to the recording of the disclosure statement.

Case : Babu Sahebagouda Rudragouda v. State of Karnataka [2024] GCtR 3486 (SC)

Corporate Law and The Legal Aspects of Corporate Guarantee : Supreme Court Explains the Law

Corporate Law and The Legal Aspects of Corporate Guarantee : Supreme Court Explains the Law

In a recent Judgment the law on corporate guarantee has been explained.

It is held that the corporate guarantees executed by the corporate debtor constitute “financial debt” within the meaning of Section 5(8) of the IBC, 2016. 

It is apposite to note that for a debt to become “financial debt” for the purpose of Part II of IBC, the essential elements of disbursal, and that too against the consideration for time value of money, needs to be found in the genesis of any debt before it may be treated as “financial debt” within the meaning of Section 5(8) of IBC. This debt may be of any nature but a part of it is always required to be carried, or corresponding to, or at least having some traces of disbursal against consideration for the time value of money.

Under Section 5(7) of IBC, a person can be categorized as a financial creditor if a financial debt is owed to it. Section 5(8) of IBC stipulates that the essential ingredient of a financial debt is disbursal against consideration for the time value of money.

A liability arising from the corporate guarantee squarely falls within the ambit of financial debt as defined under Section 5(8) of the Code. The amount of any liability in respect of any of the guarantees for money borrowed against the payment of interest is a “financial debt” within Section 5(8) of IBC.

It is well settled legal proposition that a guarantor incurs a coextensive liability with that of a principal borrower and such liability is enforceable in law. 

The Reserve Bank of India has issued a master circular dated 01.07.2015, which provides for prudential norms on income recognition or NPA Classification, and provisioning pertaining to advances. The said master circular mandates that in case of restructured assets, its asset classification will be reckoned from the date it became NPA on the first occasion.

In exercise of the powers conferred under IBC, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 have been framed. Regulation 10 of the Regulations deals with substantiation of claims, whereas Regulation 13 provides for verification of the claims. Regulation 10 of the said Regulations provides that IRP or RP may call for such other evidence or clarification as he deems fit from a creditor for substantiating the whole or part of its claim.

The production of corporate guarantees in a proceeding in New Delhi, does not attract the provisions of Maharashtra Stamp Duty Act, 1958. In any case, the legal position governing the effect of insufficiently stamped document is no longer res integra and the same does not become void or unenforceable merely on that account.

The defect of insufficient stamping of the document is curable in nature and does not go to the root of validity of the instrument. Even otherwise, the Stamp Act is a fiscal measure enacted to secure revenue for the State on certain classes of instrument. It is not intended to be used as a weapon by a litigant to defeat the cause of the opponent.

“Non stamping or improper stamping does not result in the instrument becoming invalid. The Stamp Act does not render such an instrument void. The non-payment of stamp duty is accurately characterized as a curable defect.” Therefore, the contention that the corporate guarantees were not duly stamped as Stamp Duty under the Maharashtra Stamp Duty Act, 1958 was not paid is sans substance.

Case : State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C. [2026] GCtR 350 (SC)

Criminal Law : Can False Complaints under Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 be Allowed to Continue ?

Criminal Law : Can False Complaints under Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 be Allowed to Continue ?

In an interesting case, law on SC/ST Act was explained.

In that case, words used were : "It’s called cheep people and only one brand available for these people: DHOBI BRAND – feeling naughty ; Moral of the story that Dhoban is Brand ambassador of fools & donkeys and only they r follow her always."

It was held that if utterances was not directed against a member of scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, but were directed against members of scheduled caste or scheduled tribe or the community as a whole, it would not make out an offence u/s. 3(1)(x) of the SC&ST Act.

The utterances should be directed against the individual member and not against a group of members or crowd or public in general, though they may comprise of members of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe. Generalized statements against all and sundry, and not against specific individual belonging to the scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, would not make out an offence u/s 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. 

Case :  Gayatri @ Apurna Singh v. State [2017] GCtR 6662 (Delhi)