Criminal Law : FSL Reports and Its Role in Criminal Cases Involving Murder

Criminal Law : FSL Reports and Its Role in Criminal Cases Involving Murder

In a recent case, role of FSL report was brought forth. The case was related to S.302 of IPC.

In this case, it was noted that the case "is not a case of direct evidence."  In this case, it was alleged that on thumb of the present accused/applicant, one bite mark was detected and the same was found to contain saliva of the deceased, which connects him with aggressive sex that led to death of the deceased. CCTV footage depicting the four accused persons carrying away dead body of the deceased in a bag.

As regards circumstantial evidence also, there is no witness who had seen the deceased last alive with any of the accused persons. Even according to prosecution case, the alleged sexual activity between the deceased and the four accused persons took place inside the room. That being so, the possible evidence connecting the accused/applicant with the so called aggressive sex, could have been obtained through forensic examination. But, according to FSL, no sexual activity was detected on examination of the dead body. 

In other words, even if prosecution version is assumed to be correct to the effect that the accused persons engaged services of the deceased for sex and one of them carried out aggressive sex, which turned fatal for the deceased, it cannot be said as to which of the four accused persons was responsible for that. 

Merely because of the deceased’s bite mark on thumb of the present accused/applicant, it cannot be said that it is the accused/applicant only who carried out the aggressive sex, which turned out to be fatal. 

Accused was held entitled to bail.

Citation : Ram Nath v. State NCTD [2026] GCtR 361 (Delhi)

Civil Suits and Ways and Means For Quicker Disposal of Civil Suits

Civil Suits and Ways and Means For Quicker Disposal of Civil Suits

In a recent case, issue was related to Order VIII Rule 1 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the condonation of delay in filing the written statement.

It was held thus :

"It had become a tendency of the defendants to prolong the trial of the case and to drag the proceedings as long as possible, since prolonging of the proceedings itself results in defeating justice. In order to curb this tendency, amendments were made in Civil Procedure Code and while the written statement should be filed within 30 days, extension of time for filing written statement beyond 30 days but within 90 days should be given if reasonable grounds are shown by the defendant and the Court is satisfied with those grounds. Beyond 90 days, the Court is not powerless in extending the time for filing written statement but this discretion must be exercised only in exceptional cases so that the procedure does not defeat the substantive justice."

Order 7 Rule 11 proceedings are independent of the filing of a WS, and that the liberty to file an application for rejection u/o 7 Rule 11  cannot be made as a ruse fore retrieving the lost opportunity to file the WS.

The Order through which the application to condone the delay was dismissed was found to be valid and proper.

Citation : Amulaya Chawla v. Anil Kumar Gupta [2026] GCtR 359 (Delhi)

Family Law : Whether an Educated Wife can claim Maintenance From Husband ?

Family Law : Whether an Educated Wife can claim Maintenance From Husband ?

In a recent case, wife filed appeal.

The divorce petition has been filed by the respondent-husband. The wife is M.D. (Gynaecologist) and the respondent-husband is Neurosurgeon. Both are residents of Prayagraj. 

The wife was aggrieved by the impugned order dated 07.04.2025 by which an application for maintenance filed by the wife and the three children under Sections 24 and 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 has been rejected in part. The application of the wife under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 has been dismissed, however application under Section 26 for maintenance of the children has been allowed and undisputedly, the respondent is paying Rs.60,000/- per month towards their maintenance. 

Learned counsel for the husband on the other hand submits that the respondent has faithfully been paying the maintenance amount of Rs.60,000/- per month to the children without demur. He further submits that the wife is a trained specialized Gynecologist who could earn more than the respondent himself in a State like Uttar Pradesh. He further submits that learned trial court has dismissed her application under Section 24 precisely as applicant is more capable of maintaining herself because of her qualification.

HC noted that wife is a Gynecologist and is capable of earning handsomely in her line of expertise.

The contention putforth by wife that she is presently not working is rejected. Where a qualified person is capable of earning more than enough through the use of her expertise and still refrains from doing so only to impose a burden upon her husband, in such a situation the Courts can deny maintenance under Section 24. Therefore, having gone through the order passed by the learned trial court where the application under Section 24 was rejected where the learned trial court has held that the wife was earning handsomely based upon her ITRs which reflected that she was earning more than Rs.31 lakhs per annum.

Case : Dr. Garima Dubey v. Dr. Saurabh Anand Dubey [2026] GCtR 358 (Allahabad)

Cheque Dishonour under S.138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and Method to Rebut Presumption under S.139 of NI Act

Cheque Dishonour under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and Method to Rebut Presumption under S.139 of NI Act

In an important case it was held that though security cheques are per se not shut out from the ambit of Negotiable Instruments Act but they are in the nature of an acceptance of the fact that in case “debt” crystallizes in to existence and becomes “in presenti”, nonetheless the background in which such security cheques are given are of relevance.

In this case accused had successfully rebutted the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, namely, the existence of a legally enforceable debt by establishing that the cheques were never given as security margin and no intimation was given to him about the use of such cheques.

Three Factor Test

For the application of provision of Section 138 of the NI Act, 3 ingredients are required to be satisfied, i.e., 

I. That there should be a legally enforceable debt; 

II. That the cheque should have been drawn from the account of the bank for discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability which pre-supposes a legally enforceable debt; and 

III.That the cheques so issued are dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. 

Holder of Cheque and Presumptions

Under Section 139 of NI Act, unless the contrary is proved, the holder of the cheque shall be presumed to have received the cheque in discharge of any debt or liability. 17. Sub-clause (a) of Section 118 of the NI Act, inter-alia, provides that unless the contrary is proved, the drawn up negotiable instrument, if accepted, has to be presumed to be for consideration. 

Provisions of section 138 to 142 of the NI Act, is for the purpose of giving credibility to negotiable instruments in business transactions. In view of section 139 of the NI Act, it had to be presumed that a cheque is always issued in discharge of any debt or other liability. The presumption could be rebutted by adducing evidence and the burden of proof is on the person who wants to rebut the presumption. 

Debt and Presumption under S.139

Section 139 of the NI Act merely raises a presumption in regard to the cheque having been issued in discharge of any debt or liability but not the existence per se of a legally recoverable debt. 

Section 139 of the NI Act includes the presumption regarding the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability and that the holder of a cheque is also presumed to have received the same in discharge of such debt or liability.

Section 139 of the NI Act, 1881 is stated to be an example of a reverse onus clause which is in tune with the legislative intent of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. Section 138 of the NI Act provides for speedy remedy in a criminal forum, in relation to dishonour of cheques.

Case : Varun Capital Services Ltd v. Rajesh Kumar [2015] GCtR 6664 (Delhi)

GST and Tax : Steps to be Taken Before Issuing Orders which are Adverse to Assessee

GST and Tax : Steps to be Taken Before Issuing Orders which are Adverse to Assessee

Before passing any orders which are adverse to the assessee, the authorities are duty bound to give a hearing to the assessee, and further, the proviso to Rule 92(3) of the CGST Rules, 2017 provides that an opportunity of being heard be provided to the assessee prior to the rejection of the refund claim application.  

Citation : Infinx Services Pvt. Ltd v. Union of India [2026] GCtR 357 (Bombay)

Cheque Dishonour under S.138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and Non-Production of Books of Accounts in Complaints for Cheque-Dishonour

Cheque Dishonour under S.138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and Non-Production of Books of Accounts in Complaints for Cheque-Dishonour

In an interesting case, the Metropolitan Magistrate acquitted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The acquittal was found justified.

Supply of Goods

In this case, petitioner was a proprietorship concern dealing in business of papers and packaging and the accused used to have a running account with the petitioner company for purchasing papers. The accused had placed an order for supply of papers with an assurance of payment on delivery vide invoice dated 29th April 2011 and 30th April 2011 amounting to a total of ₹5,80,598/- and as there was a previous balance of ₹35,983/- on the accused and the petitioner had later purchased paper from the accused for a sum of ₹1,80,611/-, after adjusting the same the liability of the accused towards petitioner as on 30th April 2011 was of ₹4,35,970/-. 

In discharge of that liability the accused issued a cheque bearing number 158770 drawn on Syndicate Bank for a sum of ₹4,35,970/- in favour of the petitioner company. On presentation of the aforesaid cheque, it was dishonoured with remarks ‘Account Closed’ vide return memo dated 19 th September 2011. Legal demand notice was sent to the accused. Despite the service of legal notice, the accused failed to make the payment. Hence, the complaint.

In his defence he claimed that the petitioner had cheated him and he was not liable to pay any amount to the petitioner. He further submitted that he used to supply goods to the petitioner and a sum of ₹2,68,781/- had to be paid by the petitioner to him.

Improper Bills and A Source of Defence for Accused

Statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein he stated that he never bought any paper from the petitioner but used to supply paper to the petitioner and the bills placed by the petitioner are not in order otherwise they would have been countersigned. As regards the cheque the accused stated that the cheque was lost by him of which he had lodged a police complaint in the month of August 2011 and when he received the legal notice it was duly replied by him.

Accused examined himself as DW-1 wherein he reiterated his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. He further stated that he used to sell corrugated papers to the petitioner of which he filed around 15 bills vide Ex.DW-1/A-1 to A-15 having signatures of the petitioner along with stamp. He also stated have the petitioner owed him a sum of ₹2,68,781. He also reproduced his DVAT form from 1st April 2011 to 30th September 2011 vide Ex.DW-1/B and copy of summary of purchase for the month of April, May, August and September 2011 as Ex.CW-1/D-1 to D-4. The accused also produced ledger balance with the petitioner vide Ex.DW-1/E. He also stated that he had replied to the notice of the petitioner and produced a copy of the reply as Mark A and sent notice for recovery of his outstanding amount as Mark B. He also proved his complaint regarding loss of cheque as Ex.DW-1/F. 

Liability and Evidence in Cheque- Dishonour

After perusing the evidence on record, the petitioner has relied on two invoices to show the liability of the accused but none of these two invoices are countersigned by the accused. The ledger of the running account with the accused has not been placed on record by the petitioner. Moreover, the invoices and ledger with respect to the business transactions between the petitioner and the accused that have been relied upon by the accused have not been denied by the petitioner. 

Absence of Countersign

From the material placed on record it was held that it is evident that the petitioner purchased goods from the accused on 15 occasions and kept on paying those in regular intervals leaving a balance of ₹2,68,781 on 24th March 2011. After this the petitioner claimed to have sold goods to the accused on 29th April 2011 and 30th April 2011 through two invoices which are not countersigned by the accused despite that being the usual practice of the petitioner of countersigning the invoices whenever he purchased goods from the accused. The petitioner chose not to produce any book of accounts in support of the invoices filed by him yet admitting the last sale by the respondent and adjustment of ₹35,983/-. 

Case : Swastik Paper and Packaging v. Amit Upadhyaya [2019] GCtR 6663 (Delhi)

Criminal Law and Legal Principles of Genuineness of FIR Explained by Supreme Court

Criminal Law and Legal Principles of Genuineness of FIR Explained by Supreme Court

In a recent case, the issue of genuineness of FIR was discussed.

It was noted thus : "Apparently, thus, the close relatives of the deceased had gone to the police station in the late hours of 19th September itself. If this version was true then, in natural course, these persons were bound to divulge about the incident to the police and their statement/s which would presumably be about an incident of the homicidal death would have mandatorily been entered in the Daily Dairy of the police station if not treated to be the FIR. However, the Daily Diary or the Roznamcha entry of the police station corresponding to the so called visit by the relatives of the deceased to the police station was not brought on record which creates a grave doubt on the genuineness of the FIR". 

Conduct of Family Members

It was observed that "the conduct of the family members of the deceased and the other villagers in not taking any steps to protect the dead body for the whole night and instead, casually going back to their houses without giving a second thought as to what may happen to the mortal remains of the deceased, lying exposed to the elements is another circumstance which creates a grave doubt in the mind of the Court that no one had actually seen the incident and it was a case of blind murder which came to light much later. if at all the sequence of events as emanating from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was having even a grain of truth, then it cannot be believed that the dead body would be abandoned in this manner or that even the police officials would not put a guard at the crime scene."

Law on Disclosure Statement

The statement of an accused recorded by a police officer under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is basically a memorandum of confession of the accused recorded by the Investigating Officer during interrogation which has been taken down in writing. The confessional part of such statement is inadmissible and only the part which distinctly leads to discovery of fact is admissible in evidence.

Thus, when the Investigating Officer steps into the witness box for proving such disclosure statement, he would be required to narrate what the accused stated to him. As per Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 oral evidence in all cases must be direct. The section leaves no ambiguity and mandates that no secondary/hearsay evidence can be given in case of oral evidence, except for the circumstances enumerated in the section. In case of a person who asserts to have heard a fact, only his evidence must be given in respect of the same. 

Can Memorandum prepared by IO has an Effect ?

Mere exhibiting of memorandum prepared by the Investigating Officer during investigation cannot tantamount to proof of its contents. While testifying on oath, the Investigating Officer would be required to narrate the sequence of events which transpired leading to the recording of the disclosure statement.

Case : Babu Sahebagouda Rudragouda v. State of Karnataka [2024] GCtR 3486 (SC)

Corporate Law and The Legal Aspects of Corporate Guarantee : Supreme Court Explains the Law

Corporate Law and The Legal Aspects of Corporate Guarantee : Supreme Court Explains the Law

In a recent Judgment the law on corporate guarantee has been explained.

It is held that the corporate guarantees executed by the corporate debtor constitute “financial debt” within the meaning of Section 5(8) of the IBC, 2016. 

It is apposite to note that for a debt to become “financial debt” for the purpose of Part II of IBC, the essential elements of disbursal, and that too against the consideration for time value of money, needs to be found in the genesis of any debt before it may be treated as “financial debt” within the meaning of Section 5(8) of IBC. This debt may be of any nature but a part of it is always required to be carried, or corresponding to, or at least having some traces of disbursal against consideration for the time value of money.

Under Section 5(7) of IBC, a person can be categorized as a financial creditor if a financial debt is owed to it. Section 5(8) of IBC stipulates that the essential ingredient of a financial debt is disbursal against consideration for the time value of money.

A liability arising from the corporate guarantee squarely falls within the ambit of financial debt as defined under Section 5(8) of the Code. The amount of any liability in respect of any of the guarantees for money borrowed against the payment of interest is a “financial debt” within Section 5(8) of IBC.

It is well settled legal proposition that a guarantor incurs a coextensive liability with that of a principal borrower and such liability is enforceable in law. 

The Reserve Bank of India has issued a master circular dated 01.07.2015, which provides for prudential norms on income recognition or NPA Classification, and provisioning pertaining to advances. The said master circular mandates that in case of restructured assets, its asset classification will be reckoned from the date it became NPA on the first occasion.

In exercise of the powers conferred under IBC, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 have been framed. Regulation 10 of the Regulations deals with substantiation of claims, whereas Regulation 13 provides for verification of the claims. Regulation 10 of the said Regulations provides that IRP or RP may call for such other evidence or clarification as he deems fit from a creditor for substantiating the whole or part of its claim.

The production of corporate guarantees in a proceeding in New Delhi, does not attract the provisions of Maharashtra Stamp Duty Act, 1958. In any case, the legal position governing the effect of insufficiently stamped document is no longer res integra and the same does not become void or unenforceable merely on that account.

The defect of insufficient stamping of the document is curable in nature and does not go to the root of validity of the instrument. Even otherwise, the Stamp Act is a fiscal measure enacted to secure revenue for the State on certain classes of instrument. It is not intended to be used as a weapon by a litigant to defeat the cause of the opponent.

“Non stamping or improper stamping does not result in the instrument becoming invalid. The Stamp Act does not render such an instrument void. The non-payment of stamp duty is accurately characterized as a curable defect.” Therefore, the contention that the corporate guarantees were not duly stamped as Stamp Duty under the Maharashtra Stamp Duty Act, 1958 was not paid is sans substance.

Case : State Bank of India v. Doha Bank Q.P.S.C. [2026] GCtR 350 (SC)

Criminal Law : Can False Complaints under Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 be Allowed to Continue ?

Criminal Law : Can False Complaints under Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 be Allowed to Continue ?

In an interesting case, law on SC/ST Act was explained.

In that case, words used were : "It’s called cheep people and only one brand available for these people: DHOBI BRAND – feeling naughty ; Moral of the story that Dhoban is Brand ambassador of fools & donkeys and only they r follow her always."

It was held that if utterances was not directed against a member of scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, but were directed against members of scheduled caste or scheduled tribe or the community as a whole, it would not make out an offence u/s. 3(1)(x) of the SC&ST Act.

The utterances should be directed against the individual member and not against a group of members or crowd or public in general, though they may comprise of members of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe. Generalized statements against all and sundry, and not against specific individual belonging to the scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, would not make out an offence u/s 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. 

Case :  Gayatri @ Apurna Singh v. State [2017] GCtR 6662 (Delhi)

Law of Contract and The Time Limit to Complete the Promise : Supreme Court Explains the Legal Position

Law of Contract and The Time - Limit to Complete the Promise : Supreme Court Explains the Legal Position

In a recent judgment important principles were explained.

It was held that Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 says that when a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing within a specified time but fails to do so, the contract or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee if the intention of the parties was that time should be of the essence of the contract. If time is not the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing on or before the specified time but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. Further, if in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor’s failure to perform his promise within the time agreed and the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so.

Breach of Contract

Sections 73 and 74 deal with consequences of breach of contract. Heading of Section 73 is compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract. When a contract is broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive from the party who has broken the contract compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach or which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it. On the other hand, Section 74 deals with compensation for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated for. When a contract is broken, if a sum is mentioned in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled whether or not actually damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or the penalty stipulated for.

Effect on Non-Adherence to Time

A conjoint reading of Sections 55, 73 and 74 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 would indicate that in a contract whether time is of the essence or not, if the contractor fails to execute the contract within the specified time, the contract becomes voidable at the option of the promisee and the promisee would be entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. However, in case of a contract where time is of the essence, the contract becomes voidable on account of the contractor’s failure to execute the contract within the agreed time. The promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by such breach of the contract unless he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to claim compensation. This is made more specific in Section 73. Section 74 contemplates a situation where penalty is provided for and quantified as compensation for breach of contract. In such a case, the party complaining of the breach is entitled to compensation whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby but such compensation shall not exceed the quantum of penalty stipulated.

Scope of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is now well crystallized by a plethora of judgments. Section 34 is not in the nature of an appellate provision. It provides for setting aside an arbitral award that too only on very limited grounds i.e. as those contained in sub-sections (2) and (2A) of Section 34. It is the only remedy for setting aside an arbitral award. An arbitral award is not liable to be interfered with only on the ground that the award is illegal or is erroneous in law which would require re-appraisal of the evidence adduced before the arbitral tribunal. If two views are possible, there is no scope for the court to re-appraise the evidence and to take the view other than the one taken by the arbitrator. The view taken by the arbitral tribunal is ordinarily to be accepted and allowed to prevail. 

Case : Consolidated Construction Consortium Ltd v. STPI [2025] GCtR 1950 (SC)

Criminal Law and The Law on Evidentiary Value of Panchnama and Discovery of Fact

Criminal Law and The Law on Evidentiary Value of Panchnama and Discovery of Fact

In a recent Judgment, important legal issues have been explained.

It is held that the contents of the panchanama are not substantive evidence. The law is settled on that issue. What is substantive evidence is what has been stated by the panchas or the persons concerned in the witness box. 

Where, therefore, a fact has already been discovered any information given in that behalf afterwards cannot be said to lead to the discovery of the fact. There cannot be a rediscovery. Where the information as to the fact said to have been discovered is already in the possession of the police, the information given over again does not actually lead to any discovery so that its discovery over again in consequence of the information given by the accused is rightly inadmissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 

Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is in the nature of an exception to the general rules contained in the two preceding Sections 25 and 26, respectively. Section 25 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes inadmissible any confession by an accused person to a police officer. Under Section 26, no confession by any person while he is in the custody of a police officer shall be proved against such person unless it be made in the presence of a Magistrate. Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 says that such part of the information given by an accused person while in the custody of a police officer may be proved against him as distinctly relates to the fact which is thereby discovered. It therefore makes admissible a confession made while in police custody if the other conditions laid in it are fulfilled. Being an exception to the general rule it has to be strictly construed. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does not permit the admission in evidence of the whole of the confession, but of such portion only of it as can be said to relate distinctly to the fact discovered. 

The conditions necessary for the applicability of Section 27 of the Evidence Act are broadly as under:- 1. Discovery of fact in consequence of an information received from accused; 2. Discovery of such fact to be deposed to; 3. The accused must be in police custody when he gave information; and 4. So much of information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible.

Case : Anand Jakkappa Pujari @ Gaddadar v. State of Karnataka [2026] GCtR 349 (SC)

Tax and GST : Law and Legal Principles of Show Cause Notice and Further Proceedings under CGST Act, 2017

Tax and GST : Law and Legal Principles of Show Cause Notice and Further Proceedings under CGST Act, 2017

In a recent judgment related to GST, legal principles of show cause notice under CGST Act, 2017 was discussed.

In this case, in response to notice dated 11.08.2025, petitioner claims to have submitted detailed reply in Form GST-ASMT-11 along with all the relevant documents on 25.08.2025. Despite detailed reply, respondent No.2 issued show cause notice in terms of Section 73(1) of CGST Act, 2017 read with, UTGST Act. In show cause notice dated 26.09.2025, respondent No.2 had alleged that reply was not found satisfactory as relevant/supporting documents essential for verification of discrepancies were not uploaded.

Petitioner vide said show cause notice was directed to submit its reply within 30 days and to appear for personal hearing on 17.10.2025. However, petitioner sought extension of time for filing its reply and also sought adjournment of personal hearing vide its letters dated 13.10.2025 and 16.10.2025. Respondent No.2, however, issued reminder notice dated 27.10.2025 to submit its reply by 04.11.2025 and to attend personal hearing on 03.11.2025. However, as per petitioner it missed to reply to the said reminder notice and requested another opportunity for filing reply and for personal hearing. Subsequently, petitioner had duly filed reply to said show cause notice in Form GST-DRC-06 along with supporting documents on GST portal on 26.11.2025. It is the case of petitioner that despite detailed reply, respondent No.2 proceeded to pass the order confirming demand of Rs.13,42,051/- against the petitioner without considering submissions made therein.

HC noted that order dated 24.12.2025  goes to show that authorities have not taken into consideration reply dated 26.11.2025, though authorities in para No.5 had acknowledged reply by petitioner dated 26.11.2025, but had rejected the same only by asserting that same does not adequately address the issue raised in show cause notice. It was also claimed that tax payer had not furnished any documentary evidence on record or supporting material to substantiate submissions made in reply and had concluded that in absence of any satisfactory reply, the demand raised as per show cause notice has to be confirmed. 

Writ Jurisdiction in Tax Matters

Generally, Courts while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India do not interfere with orders which are appealable before appropriate authority. However, availability of alternative remedy does not operate as a complete bar to exercise writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India. There are exceptions to general rule of non-interference and Courts are bound to interfere if writ petition is filed for enforcement of any fundamental right or where there has been violation of principle of natural justice or where the order of proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or vires of the Act are under challenge. In the event of any of these eventualities, exercise of writ jurisdiction by Court is fully justified and rather Courts are bound to act and ensure compliance of fundamental rights/principle of natural justice/jurisdiction vested in the authority.

Steps Before Passing Order Against Assessee

Perusal of the Tax Department's order goes to show that petitioner had duly submitted its reply along with relevant/requisite documents on GST portal on 26.11.2025. This fact stands acknowledged not only by acknowledgment slip annexed with the petition by the petitioner, but also by acknowledgment by authorities in para No.5 of the Tax Department's order. However, perusal of Tax Department's order goes to show that no reasons for not finding reply and documents annexed with reply uploaded on portal to be satisfactory have been given. The satisfaction recorded by authority that “taxpayer has not furnished any documentary evidence, records or supporting material to substantiate the statement made in the reply” has not been supported by any reasoning. No contention raised by petitioner or documents attached with reply dated 26.11.2025 has been noted, referred to or dealt with. The satisfaction so recorded by authorities below was required to be based upon reasoning which ought to have been reflected by way of impugned order. An order passed without any reasoning cannot be justified and can only be held to be a non-speaking order and violative of principles of natural justice. Authorities exercising quasi judicial or judicial powers are bound to consider reply so preferred by assessee and are bound to give reasons for not agreeing to the contentions raised in the reply. An order without reasoning cannot be sustained and amounts to violation of principles of natural justice.

Case : Hudson Insurance Brokers Pvt Ltd v. UT of Chandigarh [2026] GCtR 348 (P&H)

Tax and GST : Legal Principles of Refund of Tax and Interest under CGST Act, 2017

Tax and GST : Legal Principles of Refund of Tax and Interest under CGST Act, 2017

In a recent Judgment legal issues of refund of tax was discussed. It was held that "the expression ‘relevant date’ is required to be construed with reference to the category under which the refund claim falls. In cases involving simple export of goods, and tax has been paid at the time of export, the relevant date would be construed in terms of Explanation 2(a). In case of other kinds of exports such as deemed exports, Explanation 2(b) would apply. In respect of zero-rated supplies made to a SEZ developer or unit, the applicable provision would be Explanation 2(ba). Insofar as export of services is concerned, the relevant date would be governed by Explanation 2(c). In the case of unutilised ITC, Explanation 2(e) would be applicable. Therefore, the scheme of the CGST Act, 2017 accords different treatment to different types of exports. All exports are not treated identically."

The period within which the refund of any tax and interest under the CGST Act, 2017 is to be sought, has been prescribed under Section 54. The said provision comprises various sub-sections and Explanations, which requires interpretation in the present petitions.

Aspects of S.54 (1) of CGST Act, 2017

As per Section 54(1) of the CGST Act, 2017 an application for refund is required to be made before the expiry of two years, which is to be computed from the relevant date. Section 54(1) of the CGST Act stipulates three aspects: (i) That refunds of any tax and interest can be claimed by tax payers; (ii) The same ought to be claimed within two years; (iii) That the two year period is to be calculated from the relevant date

The amounts for which the refund can be claimed includes tax and interest. Under Explanation (1) to Section 54 of the CGST Act, the term ‘refund’ has been defined.

Limitation Period for Claiming Refund

Coming to the second aspect, i.e., the limitation period within which refund can be claimed, the general rule is that refund applications have to be made prior to the expiry of two years from the relevant date. The expression relevant date is defined in Explanation (2)(a) to (h) to Section 54 of the CGST Act. The provision stipulates distinct relevant dates depending upon the nature of transaction, including supplies, exports, etc.

Determination of Relevant Date For Refund

It is evident that the determination of relevant date under Section 54 of the CGST Act, 2017 is not uniform - the same depends upon the nature of the transaction and the category of the refund claimed. The statutory scheme highlighted provides a comprehensive framework for indentifying the relevant date in diverse transactions, including exports, deemed exports, services, unutilised ITC etc.

Consequently, in each case, the applicable clause of Explanation 2 must be carefully applied, in light of the nature of the transaction in question. 

Case : Kanika Exports v. Union of India [2026] GCtR 347 (Delhi)

Civil Suits in Property Disputes and the Order of Priority of Applications Filed under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Civil Suits in Property Disputes and the Order of Priority of Applications Filed under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

In an important Judgment, issue of application under Order VII Rule 11 and the one made under Order VI Rule 17 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 

It was held that the appropriate approach would be to examine, whether the Court lacks inherent or subject matter jurisdiction. If such a contention is raised and the Court prima facie finds such contention worthy of consideration, the Court may decide to hear the application for rejection of the Plaint first as the Court may then lack jurisdiction to consider the prayer for amendment in the Plaint also. In all other cases, the application for amendment ought to be decided before considering the prayer for rejection of the Plaint.

Priority of Applications 

If the Court lacks inherent jurisdiction, then the question whether the Court lacking jurisdiction could entertain an application for amendment of the plaint would warrant adjudication. In that context, it has been enunciated that the correct procedure that the Court ought to follow would be to examine the plaint as it stood when filed, and consider whether on a holistic reading of the plaint, the Court totally lacked or inherently lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

Lack of inherent or Subject matter jurisdiction

A slightly different consideration may be required to be bestowed where the rejection of the Plaint is sought on the ground that the Court lacks inherent jurisdiction to entertain the Suit. In such a situation a question may arise whether the Court lacking in inherent jurisdiction would be competent to decide an application for amendment in the Plaint. If it is a case of lack of inherent or subject matter jurisdiction, it could be urged that the application for the rejection of the Plaint be determined first as the Court lacking in inherent or subject matter jurisdiction may not have the jurisdictional competence to even delve into the question of amendment in the Plaint. 

Case : Pyramid Alliance LLP v. Karan Celista A Wing Cooperative Housing Society Ltd [2026] GCtR 346 (Bombay)

Tax and GST : Interpretation of Section 73 and Section 74 of CGST Act, 2017 on Input Tax Credit and the Elements of Fraud

Tax and GST : Interpretation of Section 73 and Section 74 of CGST Act, 2017 on Input Tax Credit and the Elements of Fraud

In a recent Judgment it has been explained that Sections 73 and 74 of CGST Act, 2017 are part of the demand and recovery provisions falling under Chapter XV, titled as “Demand and Recovery”. Section 73 provides for “Determination of tax pertaining to the period upto Financial Year 2023-24, not paid or short paid or erroneously refunded or input tax credit wrongly availed or utilized for any reason “other than fraud or any wilful misstatement or suppression of facts”. It is in such context, sub-section (1) thereof provides that the proper officer shall serve notice in such circumstances, on the person chargeable with tax, as to why he should not pay the amount specified in the notice, along with interest payable thereon under section 50, and a penalty leviable under the provisions of CGST Act or the rules made thereunder. Sub-section (2) provides that the proper officer shall issue notice under sub-section (1) at least three months prior to the time limit specified in sub-section (10) for issuance of an order. Sub-section (3) provides that when such show cause notice has been issued for “any period” under sub-section (1), the proper officer may serve a statement, containing the details of tax not paid or short paid or erroneously refunded or input tax credit wrongly availed or utilized for such periods other than those covered under sub-section (1), on the person chargeable with tax. Sub-section (4) to sub-section (8) are the provisions which determine the further course of action, which includes the situation as contemplated in sub-section (5) that a person chargeable with tax may, before service of notice under sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the statement under sub-section (3), pay the amount of tax along with interest payable thereon under section 50 on the basis of his own ascertainment of such tax or the tax as ascertained by the proper officer and inform the proper officer in writing of such payment. The proper officer, in such case, in accordance with the provisions of sub-sections (6), (7) and (8) is required to consider whether the tax paid is adequate or they fall short of the actual payment which is required to be made.

Role of Proper Officer under S.73 of the CGST Act, 2017

It is in the aforesaid context, the effect of sub-sections (9) and (10) of Section 73 of CGST Act is required to be considered. Sub-section (9) of the said provisions ordains that the proper officer shall, after considering the representation, if any, made by the person chargeable with tax, determine the amount of tax, interest and a penalty equivalent to ten per cent, of tax, or ten thousand rupees, whichever is higher, due from such person and issue an order. In passing such order, the prescribed limitation as provided in sub-section (10) becomes applicable which provides that the proper officer shall issue the order under sub-section (9) “within three years from the due date for furnishing of annual return for the financial year” to which the tax not paid or short paid or input tax credit wrongly availed or utilized relates to or within three years from the date of erroneous refund. 

Determination of Tax and Effect of S.73 and S.74

On a holistic reading of Sections 73 and 74 of the CGST Act, insofar as determination of tax in both situations as contemplated by these provisions are concerned, the provisions appear to be a code by itself which includes machinery provisions in the nature of sub-section (1) and the other sub-sections. 

What is the Period under S.73 or S.74 of CGST Act ?

It is difficult to accept that the intention of the legislature in providing for sub-section (1) of Section 73/74 of CGST Act was to confine the authority of the proper officer to a issue show cause notice not for the different periods but for a specific period for which one return could be filed. This prima facie is clear from the plain language of the provisions and more importantly, from the conjoint reading of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3). Subsection (3) specifically uses the word “for any period under sub-section (1)”. Further, compounded by using the words “such periods other than those covered under sub-section (1) ..…”, when sub section (3) permits issuance of a statement for a period other than the period of the notice under sub-section (1), deeming it to be a notice as provided for in sub-section (4), it gives a credence to the respondents contention of it being permissible for the proper officer to issue a notice for different periods under sub-section (1), as permissible under sub-section (3) and (4).

Case : Rollmet LLP v. Union of India [2026] GCtR 345 (Bombay)

Rights of Employees and Law on Back Wages On Reinstatement

Rights of Employees and Law on Back Wages On Reinstatement

S.17B of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 says that "where in any case, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of any workman and the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a High Court or the Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable to pay such workman, during the period of pendency of such proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule if the workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit by such workman had been filed to that effect in such Court".

The Supreme Court in D.N. Krishnappa v. Deputy General Manager [2022] GCtR 2022 (SC) has held that a workman shall be entitled to the full wages from the date of order of reinstatement after deducting the amount already paid under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 

The discussion made was that "it emerges that the order of reinstatement vide award dated 18.07.2007 has been confirmed up to the Division Bench of the High Court and even by this Court. What was modified by the High Court was the back wages from the date of termination till the date of award passed by the CGIT. It was the bank – employer who obtained the stay order against the order of reinstatement which ultimately came to be terminated on 12.07.2013 when the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ appeals. As observed hereinabove, it was the employer – bank who obtained the stay against reinstatement and ultimately order of reinstatement attained the finality. Why should the employee be made suffer, when the bank obtained the stay of reinstatement and when the order of reinstatement subsequently came to be confirmed and attained the finality?

It was held that "merely because there was an interim order/stay of the order of reinstatement during the pendency of the proceedings, the employee – appellant cannot be denied the back wages/wages when ultimately the order of reinstatement came be confirmed by the Court." 

Role of Panch Witness in Cases under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Role of Panch Witness in Cases under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 

Dealing with a case under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, it has been held in Ved Prakash Maurya v. State of Delhi [2025] GCtR 1949 (Delhi) that "panch witness acts as an independent verifier of the complainant’s version, and it is his presence and corroboration that lend assurance to the allegation of demand of bribe."

It was pointed out that "when the work for which illegal gratification is allegedly demanded had already been completed prior in time, the very motive or occasion for making such a demand becomes inherently improbable. The improbability is further compounded by the fact that the appellant, at the relevant time, was working merely as a beldar in the Delhi Jal Board. It is undisputed that such an employee has no authority to process or sanction applications for water or sewer connections." 

Ultimately accused was acquitted in the case.

Criminal Law : Can Incapability of Doing Work become a Ground for Acquittal under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ?

Criminal Law : Can Incapability of Doing Work become a Ground for Acquittal under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ? 

It has been held that "a person may not actually be in a position to perform the work for which a bribe is allegedly demanded cannot, by itself, exonerate him, since the offence under the PC Act, 1988 is attracted by the very act of demanding illegal gratification, irrespective of whether the public servant is capable of doing the work".

Case : State of Maharashtra v. Ashok Daga Bachhav [2026] GCtR 344 (Aurangabad, Bombay)

Real Estate and Law : Joint Purchase of Property and Legal Issues

Real Estate and Law : Joint Purchase of Property and Legal Issues

The decision of Kulwant Singh v. Gurdeep Singh [2018] GCtR 6661 (Delhi) has explained legal issues on property disputes.

The case was about Two plots.  There was joint purchase by 2 brothers B1 SS and B2 MS.  MS is father of P.  SS is father of D. 

Civil Suit was filed by son of MS for partition which was filed by P.

D argued on oral partition. D also argued on Adverse possession.

It was held that there is no proof that B1 constructed property on share of B1.  Best proof of partition is parties acting on partition and mutation in their names. 

D said that they are in possession of their share ; D said no rent was received by MS. However, P was entitled to relief of partition. In this case, P succeeded in partition and D's claim of oral partition and of larger share was rejected.

Joint Property, Coparcenary and Legal Issues on Property Disputes

Joint Property, Coparcenary and Legal Issues on Property Disputes

The law on property disputes was discussed in Pooja Wasal v. Ramesh Grover [2025] GCtR 1948 (Delhi). 

What is Joint Hindu Family ?

A joint Hindu family, as envisaged under the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, constitutes a legal entity formed by all lineal male descendants of a common ancestor, together with their respective spouses and unmarried daughters. The continuity of such a family is legally presumed until severance of status is distinctly established. Severance necessitates demonstrable intent coupled with definitive partition, while mere divergence in rituals or residence is insufficient to disrupt the legal presumption of jointness.

"Coparcenary" : A Narrow Concept

The narrower body within this umbrella of Joint family property is the Hindu coparcenary, traditionally confined to a propositus and three male lineal descendants. The ownership within the coparcenary is collective and by birth, known as unobstructed heritage. Each coparcener acquires a fluctuating, undefined interest in the whole of the coparcenary property, which enlarges or contracts by subsequent births or deaths. Until partition, the interest remains indeterminate. A single surviving coparcener holds the estate as separate property, but a fresh coparcenary is created upon the birth of a son. The management of joint property is done by the Karta, usually the eldest coparcener, who acts as manager of the family estate, clothed with fiduciary responsibility. The Karta is empowered to represent the family, incur debts, and alienate property only for legal necessity or the benefit of the estate.

Operation of S.6 of HSA, 1956

Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, as originally enacted, dealt with the devolution of interest in the coparcenary property of a male Hindu who was a member of the Hindu coparcenary. Under the said Section, when a male Hindu, who was a coparcener in a Hindu joint family, died intestate, his undivided interest in the coparcenary property would not devolve by succession, but instead by survivorship.

Conferral of coparcenary rights upon daughters is by virtue of birth and is not contingent upon the existence of the father on the date of commencement of the amendment. The Court observed that the amendment is retroactive in application with respect to the rights it recognizes, and daughters are entitled to a share in the coparcenary property.

Ancestral Property and Joint Family Property

Ancestral property remains a separate property of the coparcener until the birth of a son, after which it becomes a joint family property. A sole surviving coparcener has full rights to sell or alienate the property as his own, but once a son is born, the property transforms into coparcenary property, restricting absolute alienation. The Court held that so long, on partition, an ancestral property remains in the hand of a single person, it has to be treated as a separate property and such a person shall be entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property treating it to be his separate property but if a son is subsequently born, the alienation made before the birth cannot be questioned. But, the moment a son is born, the property becomes a coparcenary property, and the son would acquire an interest in that and become a coparcener. 

Liability of Family Members of Husband under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

Liability of Family Members of Husband under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

The legal issue of the extent of liability of relatives was discussed in Harbans Lal Malik v. Payal Malik [2010] GCtR 6660 (Delhi).

Section 12 of PWDV Act, 2005 : Pre-requisites

Under Section 12 of PWDV Act, 2005, an "aggrieved person" can file an application to Magistrate against the respondents. 

It is apparent that in order to make a person as respondent in a petition under Section 12, there must exist a domestic relationship between the respondent and the aggrieved person. If there is no domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the respondent, the Court of MM cannot pass an order against such a person under the Act. Domestic relationship is defined under Section 2 (f) of the Act.

Domestic Relationship : How to Determine ?

It is apparent that domestic relationship arises between the two persons, who have lived together in a shared household and when they are related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family. The definition speaks of living together at any point of time however it does not speak of having relation at any point of time. Thus, if the domestic relationship continued and if the parties have lived together at any point of time in a shared household, the person can be a respondent but if the relationship does not continue and the relationship had been in the past and is not in the present, a person cannot be made respondent on the ground of a past relationship. The domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the respondent must be present and alive at the time when complaint under Domestic Violence Act is filed and if this relationship is not alive on the date when complaint is filed, the domestic relationship cannot be said to be there.

Jurisdiction of MM and Limitations 

Merely because a person is brother of the husband he cannot be arrayed as a respondent, nor does an MM gets authority over each and every relative of the husband, without going into the fact whether a domestic relationship or shared household was there between the aggrieved person and the respondent.

Boy Living Abroad

How can the parents of a boy who is working abroad, living abroad, an adult, free to take his own decisions, be arrayed as criminals or respondents if the marriage between him and his wife failed due to any reason whatsoever after few years of marriage. If the sin committed by such parents of boy is that they facilitated the marriage, then this sin is equally committed by parents of the girl.

Parents of Boy and Liability

If such marriage fails then parents of both bride and groom would have to share equal responsibility. The responsibility of parents of the groom cannot be more. Shelter of Indian culture and joint family cannot be taken to book only relatives of boy. A woman‟s shared household in India in such cases is also her parents‟ house where she lived before marriage and not her in-laws‟ house where she did not live after marriage.

What is A Family ?

It is important to consider as to what “family” is and what “joint family” is. As per Black‟s Law Dictionary (VI Edition) “family” means a collective body of persons who live in one house under one head or management. Dictionary states that the meaning of word “family” necessarily depends on field of law in which word is used, but this is the most common meaning. “Family” also means a group of blood relatives and all the relations who descend from a common ancestor or who spring from a common root. However, for the purpose of domestic violence act where the object is to protect a woman from domestic violence, “family” has to be defined as a collective body of persons who live in one house under one head or management. In Chamber‟s Dictionary (1994-95) again the “family” is defined as all those who live in one house i.e. parents, children servants; parents and their children. In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993 ed.) “family” is defined as a group of persons living in one household including parents and their children, boarders, servants and such a group is a organizational unit of society.

Effect of Parents Living Separately

Where parents live separate from their son like any other relative, the family of son cannot include his parents. The parents can be included in the family of son only when they are dependent upon the son and/or are living along with the son in the same house. But when they are not dependent upon the son and they are living separate, the parents shall constitute a separate family and son, his wife and children shall constitute a separate family. There can be no domestic relationship of the wife of son with the parents when the parents are not living along with the son and there can be no domestic relationship of a wife with the parents of her husband when son along with the wife is living abroad, maintaining a family there and children are born abroad.

Effect of S.125 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Difference Between Two Laws

The definition of “wife” as available under Section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 could not be imported into Domestic Violence Act. The Legislature was well aware of Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and if Legislature intended, it would have defined “wife” as in Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in Domestic Violence Act as well. The purpose and object of Domestic Violence and provision under Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is different. While Domestic Violence Act has been enacted by the Parliament to prevent acts of domestic violence on women living in a shared household. Section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is to prevent vagrancy where wife is left high and dry without maintenance. Law gives a right to claim maintenance under Civil Law as well as Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 even to a divorced wife, but an act of domestic violence cannot be committed on a divorced wife, who is not living with her husband or family and is free to live wherever she wants. She has a right to claim maintenance and enforce other rights as per law. She has a right to claim custody of children as per law but denial of these rights do not amount to domestic violence. Domestic Violence is not perceived in this manner. The definition of “Domestic Violence” as given in Section 3 of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 pre supposes that the woman is living with the person who committed violence and domestic relationship is not dead buried or severed. This does not speak of past violence which a woman suffered before grant of divorce.

 

 

Can Daughter-in-Law interfere in life / property of Father-in-law ?

Can Daughter-in-law interfere in life / property of Father-in-law ? 

Introduction

There is lot of confusion over course of action if parents of a boy do not want their son and wife of their son to reside with them.

In such situations, proceedings under Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or BNSS, 2023 would not be very effective. Lot of it will depend on S. 2(s) of PWDV Act, 2005. Parents can seek a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, servants, assignees, representatives etc. from entering into/or creating any hurdle in peaceful occupation of the plaintiff over the suit premises. Parents can also seek a decree of mandatory injunction against the defendants thereby directing the defendants to remove their left overs, if any, from the suit premises. 

Disowning Son : Effects

One can refer Aruna Oswal v. Pankaj Oswal [2020] GCtR 9011 (SC) which holds that "Merely disowning a son by late father or by the family, is not going to deprive him of any right in the property to which he may be otherwise entitled in accordance with the law."

Another argument can be that public notice by itself is merely an act of informing the public that the plaintiff is not responsible for the acts of the Son and his wife and that he has severed his relations with them and disowned and disinherited them from his movable and immovable properties, but it does not by itself create any legal impediment on the legal rights qua intestate/testamentary succession as per law available to the son and wife of son. 

Eviction Suit : A Possible Remedy ?

One can then refer Nopany Investment Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Santokh Singh (HUF) [2007] GCtR 9022 (SC). The point that emerges it that "filing of an eviction suit under the general law itself is a notice to quit on the tenant. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that no notice to quit was necessary under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 in order to enable the respondent to get a decree of eviction against the appellant." 

Possession and Notice to Quit

One can have a look at Nitin Jain v. Geeta Raheja [2015] GCtR 6659 (Delhi). That was a case where appeal was decided. In that case, power under Order 12 Rule 6 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was exercised. Though this was not a case of parents and daughter in law, yet law was clarified here. It was held that "Once a suit is filed for possession, the mere fact that no notice to quit and or to vacate a demised premises is given will not inhibit a court from passing a decree of possession if, there is no other impediment in law, as the institution of the suit is an expression of the intention to seek possession."

Principles of Licence

Long ago in the year 1985, Apex Court had explained the role of licensee in Sant Lal Jain Vs. Avtar Singh (1985) GCtR 6670 (SC). 2- Judges' Bench had answered the issue.  The findings of the judgment are in following terms : 

"The respondent was a licensee, and he must be deemed to be always a licensee. It is not open to him during the subsistence of the licence or in the suit for recovery of possession of the property instituted after the revocation of the licence to set up title to the property in himself or anyone else. It is his plain duty to surrender possession of the property as a licence and seek his remedy separately in case he has acquired title to property subsequently through some other person. He need not do so if he has acquired title to the property from the licensor or from some one else lawfully claiming under him, in which case there would be clear merger."

Arguments by Wife of Son

Often wife of son can raise the argument of shared household. In such case, the effort of parents should be that wife of son has not established the fact of existence of joint family or that the suit property was blended or contributed into a common stock with the intention of making it joint by common usage and shared expenses.

Balancing the Rights of Parents

Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Vinay Varma Vs. Kanika Pasricha & Another (2019) GCtR 3069 (Delhi) has considered how parents of son can legally resolve the issue. The issue discussed there is on balance between the rights of the parents/in-laws and the rights of the daughter-in-law.  Two Acts have been discussed : 1. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005  and 2. The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. 

If the relationship is acrimonious, then the parents ought to be permitted to seek eviction of the son/daughter-in-law or daughter/son-in-law from their premises. In such circumstances, the obligation of the husband to maintain the wife would continue in terms of the principles under the DV Act. 

In case the son or his family is ill-treating the parents then the parents would be entitled to seek unconditional eviction from their property so that they can live a peaceful life and also put the property to use for their generating income and for their own expenses for daily living. 

While, the daughter-in-law's right to residence and a roof over her head is extremely important, the parent‟s right to enjoy their own property and earn income from the same is also equally important. There can be multitudinal situations which may arise before Courts wherein a view would have to be taken as to which rights are to be preferred over the other. This is so because there are various categories of cases and various fact situations wherein these disputes would arise.

Aam Aadmi Party MPs and Change of Stance : What Does the Law Says on their Eligibility

Aam Aadmi Party MPs and Change of Stance : What Does the Law Says on their Eligibility

Introduction

What news reports say is that Raghav Chadha, Sandeep Pathak and Ashok Mittal, Harbhajan Singh, Swati Maliwal, Vikram Sahney and Rajinder Gupta are planning to quit AAP. [Source : https://www.newsonair.gov.in/rajya-sabha-mps-raghav-chadha-sandeep-pathak-and-ashok-mittal-quit-aam-aadmi-party/] 

Raghav Chadha, Sandeep Pathak, Dr. Ashok Kumar Mittal, Harbhajan Singh, Swati Maliwal, Dr. Vikramjit Singh Sawhney, Rajinder Gupta are members of Council of States. [Source : https://sansad.in/rs/members]

Legal Postion

A.75 (1B) of Constitution and Tenth Schedule are relevant. 

Also relevant will be A.102 (2). Point 1 (b) of Schedule is in context of that House. There is an original political party. Point 4 of Schedule is relevant. There should be merger of original political party with another party. Point 4 (2) is about deemed merger and at least 2/3rd of members of legislature party should agree to such merger. 

Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India [1994] GCtR 6658 (SC) has explained the law on burden of proof in cases of disqualifications. 

Jagjit Singh Vs. State of Haryana [2006] GCtR 6657 (SC) where the disqualification was held justified. In that case, Z contested as NCP Candidate ; Speaker found that Z had joined INC. It was held that to determine whether an independent member has joined a political party the test is not whether he has fulfilled the formalities for joining a political party. The test is whether he has given up his independent character on which he was elected by the electorate. A mere expression of outside support would not lead to an implication of a member joining a political party. The aspect of Z joining INC after winning election as NCP candidate was not in dispute. Ordinarily, the adverse inference can be drawn in respect of allegations not traversed, but there is no general rule that adverse inference must always be drawn, whatever the facts and circumstances may be.

Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya [2007] GCtR 9099 (SC) is a 5 Judges' Bench Judgment. Article 191 of the Constitution of India deals with the disqualification for membership of legislative assemblies just like Article 102 deals with disqualification for membership to the Houses of Parliament. Article 102 and Article 191 came to be amended by the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985 with effect from 1.3.1985 providing that a person shall be disqualified for being a member of either Houses of Parliament or of Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State if he is so disqualified under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution of India. In this case, split was declared in BSP. After forming new party the new party merged with ruling party SP. 

In the context of the introduction of sub-Article (2) of Article 102 and Article 191 of the Constitution, a proceeding under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution is one to decide whether a Member has become disqualified to hold his position as a Member of the Parliament or of the Assembly on the ground of defection. The Tenth Schedule cannot be read or construed independent of Articles 102 and 191 of the Constitution and the object of those Articles. A defection is added as a disqualification and the Tenth Schedule contains the provisions as to disqualification on the ground of defection. A proceeding under the Tenth Schedule gets started before the Speaker only on a complaint being made that certain persons belonging to a political party had incurred disqualification on the ground of defection. To meet the claim so raised, the Members of the Parliament or Assembly against whom the proceedings are initiated have the right to show that there has been a split in the original political party and they form one-third of the Members of the legislature of that party, or that the party has merged with another political party and hence paragraph 2 is not attracted. On the scheme of Articles 102 and 191 and the Tenth Schedule, the determination of the question of split or merger cannot be divorced from the motion before the Speaker seeking a disqualification of a member or members concerned. Therefore, in a case where a Speaker is moved by a legislature party or the leader of a legislature party to declare certain persons disqualified on the ground that they have defected, it is certainly open to them to plead that they are not guilty of defection in view of the fact that there has been a split in the original political party and they constitute the requisite number of legislators or that there has been a merger. In that context, the Speaker cannot say that he will first decide whether there has been a split or merger as an authority and thereafter decide the question whether disqualification has been incurred by the members, by way of a judicial adjudication sitting as a Tribunal. It is part and parcel of his jurisdiction as a Tribunal while considering a claim for disqualification of a member or members to decide that question not only in the context of the plea raised by the complainant but also in the context of the pleas raised by those who are sought to be disqualified that they have not incurred disqualification in view of a split in the party or in view of a merger.

It may be true that collective dissent is not intended to be stifled by the enactment of sub-article (2) of Articles 102 and 191 of the Tenth Schedule. But at the same time, it is clear that the object is to discourage defection which has assumed menacing proportions undermining the very basis of democracy. Therefore, a purposive interpretation of paragraph 2 in juxtaposition with paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Tenth Schedule is called for. One thing is clear that defection is a ground for disqualifying a member from the House. He incurs that disqualification if he has voluntarily given up his membership of his original political party, meaning the party on whose ticket he had got elected himself to the House. In the case of defiance of a whip, the party concerned is given an option either of condoning the defiance or seeking disqualification of the member concerned. But, the decision to condone must be taken within 15 days of the defiance of the whip. 

Criminal Law : Principles of Acquittal in Cases under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Criminal Law : Principles of Acquittal in Cases under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 

In this case, there was material to indicate that demand was towards expenses for the material necessary for proposed surgery of complainant to which he categorically admits that he was made aware previously itself by accused no.1 that due to non-availability of surgical material in the Government Hospital, the same would be required to be purchased from market, it cannot be said that amount demanded was only bribe or illegal gratification. Acquittal of accused was held justified. 

State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Ramgir Kailasgir Giri [2026] GCtR 341 (Aurangabad, Bombay)

*Service Law* - "While a higher educational qualification may confer an additional advantage of preference in the matter of selection, it does not supplant or override the primary requirement of essential eligibility. To hold otherwise would amount to rewriting the terms of the selection and altering the criteria after the process had commenced. A preference operates only within the zone of eligible and merit candidates; it does not enlarge or modify the field of eligibility itself. In other words, the stage of applying preference arises only after a candidate is found to fulfil the essential qualifications prescribed for the post. Where a candidate does not meet the threshold requirement of eligibility, the question of extending preference, being in merit, on account of higher qualification does not arise." - *Himakshi v. Rahul Verma [2026] GCtR 335 (SC)*