Interpreting the Concept of Res Judicata under S.11 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Interpreting the Concept of Res Judicata under S.11 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Introduction

S.11 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Code) says that "no Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court."

The section also contains around 8 explanations. Explanation 8 specifically uses the word "res judicata". 

Daryao v. State of UP [1961] GCtR 6461 (SC) has held that "we are not impressed by the argument that we should deal with the question of the applicability of the rule of res judicata to a petition under Art. 32 on the basis that like Art. 226 Art. 32 itself gives merely a discretionary power to the Court to grant an appropriate relief." "Thus the right given to the citizen to move Supreme Court by a petition under Art. 32 and claim· an appropriate writ against the unconstitutional , infringement of his fundamental rights itself is a matter of fundamental right, and in dealing with the objection based on the application of the rule of res judicata this aspect of the matter had no doubt to be borne in mind." 

As has been observed by Halsbury, "the doctrine of res judicata is not a technical doctrine applicable only to records; it is a fundamental doctrine of all courts that there must be an end of litigation". [Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd, Ed., Vol. 15, para. 357, p. 185]

Hon'ble J. (Retd) S.B. Sinha who was a Science Graduate has given some highly useful decisions on various important issues of law. In case of Union of India v. Pramod Gupta [2005] GCtR 6460 (SC) which was related to Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it was argued by then ASG that "judgments and awards made in favour of other claimants having only evidentiary value, the principle of res judicata was wholly inapplicable." Here, the principle of res judicata has been applied by the High Court in relation to two issues, viz., determination of market value and title of the Respondents in respect thereof. It was held that "the contention that as the Union of India was a party to the said awards would not by itself be a ground to invoke the principles of res judicata and/ or estoppel." It was held that "the principle of res judicata would apply only when the lis was interparties and had attained finality in respect of the issues involved. The said principle will, however, have no application inter alia in a case where the judgment and/ or order had been passed by a court having no jurisdiction therefor and / or in a case involving pure question of law. It will also have no application in a case where the judgment is not a speaking one."

In case of  Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement [2008] GCtR 6459 (SC) it was urged on behalf of the workmen that the writ petitions filed by the Company for quashing and setting aside the orders passed by the Labour Court and confirmed by the Industrial Court were barred by constructive res judicata as also under Order XXIII, Rule 4 of the Code. 

It was seen that an order of withdrawal would not constitute res judicata inasmuch as there is no decision on the merits by the Court. The Court, however, proceeded to observe that when a petition is withdrawn by the party without obtaining liberty from the Court to file fresh petition on the same subject matter, as a general rule, the petitioner is precluded from filing a fresh petition or an appeal against such an order because “he cannot be considered to be a party aggrieved by the order passed by the Court permitting withdrawal of the petition”.  It was held that "a ‘jurisdictional fact’ is one on existence of which depends jurisdiction of a Court, Tribunal or an Authority. If the jurisdictional fact does not exist, the Court or Tribunal cannot act." It was also noted that"the provisions of Code do not stricto sensu apply to ‘industrial adjudication’, even under the Code, after the Amendment Act, 1976, the normal rule is to decide all the issues together in a civil suit." 

In the case of Kumari Gayatri Tripathi v. Trust Mandir Shri Ramchanderji [2025] GCtR 1579 (Delhi), the issue was between tenant and landlord.  It was argued that petition is barred by the provisions of res judicata under Section 11 of the Code.

It was noted that "a title dispute cannot be adjudicated in a Petition under the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 or in a Revision Petition examining an order passed under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.""In addition, principle of estoppel under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, prevents a tenant from denying the landlord’s title even after the expiration of the lease unless possession is openly surrendered." 

It was held that from a reading of S.11 of Code, 1908 it is clear that what is barred by the provisions of Section 11 of the Code, 1908 is an issue which is substantially and directly the same as what has been decided by the Court previously. Quite clearly, where the Respondent/landlord has previously not filed an Eviction Petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act against the Petitioner/tenant, then the provisions of Section 11 of the Code, 1908 are not applicable to the facts of this case.