Law on Terror-Related Allegations and the Approach of Courts

 Law on Terror-Related Allegations and the Approach of Courts

The offences related to terrorism are serious. In an important Judgment, the correct approach to be adopted by Indian courts when allegations revolve around terrorism was explained. 

In that case, the   Designated   Court   opined   that   there   are   serious allegations against the respondent Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (Accused No.10) of being involved in unlawful acts and terror funding in conspiracy with other accused persons; he had acted as a conduit for transfer of funds received from terrorist Accused   No.1   Hafiz   Muhammad   Saeed,   ISI,   Pakistan   High Commission, New Delhi and also from a source in Dubai, to Hurriyat   leaders/secessionists/terrorists;   and   had   helped them   in   waging   war     against   the   Government   of   India   by repeated   attacks   on   security   forces   and   Government establishments and by damaging public property including by burning schools etc.

What was the Principle Enunciated 

It was explained that it is apposite to restate the settled legal position about matters to be considered for deciding an   application for bail,   to   wit, (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.

When   it   comes   to   offences   punishable   under   special enactments, such as the UAPA, 1967, something more is required to be kept in mind in view of the special provisions contained in Section 43D of the 1967 Act, inserted by Act 35 of 2008 w.e.f.   31st  December,   2008.

By virtue of the proviso to sub­section (5), it is the duty of the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is  prima facie  true   or   otherwise.   Our   attention   was   invited   to   the decisions of this Court, which has had an occasion to deal with   similar   special   provisions   in   TADA   and   MCOCA.   The principle underlying those decisions may have some bearing while considering the prayer for bail in relation to offences under   the  1967   Act   as   well.   Notably,   under   the   special enactments such as TADA, MCOCA and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is required to record   its opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty” of the alleged offence. There is degree of difference between the satisfaction to be recorded by the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty” of such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded for the purposes of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is “prima facie”  true.

In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that   there   are   reasonable   grounds   for   believing   that   the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge   application   or   framing   of   charges   in   relation   to offences   under   the   1967   Act.  

Be it noted that the special provision, Section 43D of the 1967 Act, applies right from   the   stage   of   registration   of   FIR   for   offences   under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act until the conclusion of the trial thereof. To wit, soon after the arrest of the accused on the basis of the FIR registered against him, but before filing of the charge­sheet by the Investigating Agency; after filing of the first charge­sheet and before the filing of the supplementary or final charge­sheet consequent to further investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C., until framing of the charges or after framing of the charges by the Court and recording of evidence of key witnesses etc. However, once charges are framed, it would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion was ounded uponthe materials before the Court, which prompted the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the  existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused, to justify the framing of charge. In that situation, the accused may have to undertake an arduous task to satisfy the court that despite the framing of charge, the materials presented along with the charge­sheet (report under Section 173   of   Cr.P.C.),   do   not   make   out   reasonable   grounds   for believing that the accusation against him is prima facie true.

For more details refer NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [2019] GCtR 1965 (SC).