December 2025 : Supreme Court Decisions

December 2025 : Supreme Court Decisions

1. It has been held in Tarachandra v. Bhawarlal [2025] GCtR 1887 (SC) that there are various modes by which rights may be acquired in an immovable property such as sale, gift, mortgage, lease etc., which are from one living person to another. Rights may also be acquired by devolution of interest through a will or inheritance/ succession on death of the title/ interest holder. There is nothing in the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 proscribing acquisition of rights under a will. Where there is no serious dispute raised by any natural legal heir, if any, of the tenure holder, in absence of any legal bar, mutation based on a will should not be denied as it would defeat the interest of Revenue.
2. Bal Kumar Patel @ Raj Kumar v. State of UP [2025] GCtR 1777 (SC)
3. Mission Accessibility v. Union of India [2025] GCtR 1778 (SC)
4. Rousanara Begum v. S.K. Salauddin @ SK Salauddin [2025] GCtR 1779 (SC)
5. Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise & Service Tax v. Narsibhai Karamsibhai Gajera [2025] GCtR 1780 (SC)
6. Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. State of WB [2025] GCtR 1781 (SC)
7. Jyoti Builders v. CEO [2025] GCtR 1782 (SC)
8. Chandan Pasi v. State of Bihar [2025] GCtR 1763 (SC)
9. Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav v. State of UP [2025] GCtR 1788 (SC)
10. BPL Limited v. Morgan Securities and Credits Pvt Ltd [2025] GCtR 1789 (SC)
11. State of Karnataka v. Taghar Vasudeva Ambrish [2025] GCtR 1790 (SC) on tax liability, rental income and real estate. The term “residential dwelling” is not defined under the GST laws. Under the erstwhile Finance Act, 1994, an Education Guide dated 20.06.2012 issued by the CBIC explained it. Prior to the implementation of the GST, only commercial properties let out were subjected to service tax even if a residential property was used for commercial purposes. Service tax was charged at a rate of 15% of the rent for commercial properties. However, rental income from residential properties did not attract service tax. This meant that landlords who owned commercial properties and rented them out were required to register for service tax and pay the tax on the rental income received. On the other hand, landlords who owned residential properties and rented them out were not required to register for service tax or pay tax on the rental income they received. On the introduction of GST, the tax regime for rental income has undergone a significant change. Under the GST regime, renting both commercial and residential properties is treated as a taxable supply of service. GST is applicable on rental income received by landlords as well as rent paid by tenants. However, the Central Government, on being satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest and on the recommendation of the GST Council, has issued Notification No. 9/2017- Integrated Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 giving exemption from levying GST on various services described item wise in the Notification. For our purpose, it relates to Entry No. 13 by which an unconditional exemption was provided to renting of a residential dwelling to any person when the same is used for residence. Meaning thereby, GST is payable in the case of renting of a residential dwelling to any person when the same is used for the commercial purpose. The Explanation added to Entry 13 w.e.f. 01.01.2023 clearly shows that even if the rent is paid by a registered person, the exemption will be available if it is used for the purpose of own residence and is rented in the personal capacity. Therefore, the intention from the beginning was to ensure that rental agreements for use of the property for residential purposes are granted exemption from GST. 
12. Bhaskar Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra [2025] GCtR 1791 (SC).
13. Rocky v. State of Telangana [2025] GCtR 1794 (SC).
14. Dadu @ Ankush v. State of MP [2025] GCtR 1803 (SC).
15. Sonia Virk v. Rohit Watts [2025] GCtR 1804 (SC).
16. Bolla Malathi v. B. Suguna [2025] GCtR 1805 (SC).
17. Yogamaya M.G. v. Union of India [2025] GCtR 1806 (SC).
18. Harshbir Singh Pannu v. Jaswinder Pannu [2025] GCtR 1807 (SC).
19. Sohanvir @ Sohanvir Dhama v. State of UP [2025] GCtR 1808 (SC).
20. R. Logeshkumar v. P. Balasubramaniam [2025] GCtR 1809 (SC).
21. Govind Mandavi v. State ot Chhattisgarh [2025] GCtR 1810 (SC).
22. Akola Municipal Corporation v. Zishan Hussain Azhar Hussain [2025] GCtR 1813 (SC).
23. HPCL v. BCL Secure Premises Pvt Ltd [2025] GCtR 1814 (SC) - On arbitration where it was held in context of S.11 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 that referral court should be prima facie satisfied that there exists an arbitration agreement and as to whether the non-signatory is a veritable party. Even if the referral court prima facie arrives at the satisfaction that the nonsignatory is a veritable party, the Arbitral Tribunal is not denuded of its jurisdiction to decide whether the nonsignatory is indeed a party to the arbitration agreement on the basis of factual evidence and application of legal doctrine. As to whether the non-signatory is bound would be for the Arbitral Tribunal to decide. The referral court under Section 11 of A&C Act 1996 is not deprived of its jurisdiction from examining whether the non-signatory is in the real sense a party to the arbitration agreement. The answer thereof will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case after examining the documents pertaining thereto.
24. Amal Kumar v. State of Jharkhand [2025] GCtR 1815 (SC) - On criminal law and SC&ST (PoA) Act, 1989. Quashing the FIR under S.3(1)(s) of SC&ST (PoA) Act, 1989 it was noted that there is no offence as coming out under Section 3(1)(s) of the Act of 1989 since there is no allegation that the casteist slur was made in a place within public view or that there was any member of the public present at the spot.
25. Suvej Singh v. Ram Naresh [2025] GCtR 1816 (SC) has held that "any unnecessary remand by a Higher Court generates fresh round of litigation, which should be avoided." A perusal of S.30 of Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 shows that the Collector is duty bound to maintain, in the manner prescribed, a map and a field book for each village. Any changes made therein have to be recorded annually or after such longer intervals as may be prescribed. The second part of section provides that the Collector shall also cause to correct any errors or omissions which are detected from time to time in any such map or field book.
26. Mohan Lal Fatehpuria v. Bharat Textiles [2025] GCtR 1817 (SC).
27. Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India [2025] GCtR 1824 (SC) has examined the law of Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013. The phrase ‘where the respondent is an employee’ as contained in Section 11 of the POSH Act, cannot be interpreted to mean that ICC proceedings against a ‘respondent’ may only be instituted before the ICC constituted at the workplace of the ‘respondent’. Such a restrictive interpretation of the POSH Act will run contrary to the scheme of the Act, specifically in light of the all-encompassing and wide definition which has been given to the term ‘workplace’ in Section 2(o) of the POSH Act, particularly in light of Section 2(o)(v) which expands the scope of ‘workplace’ to include any place visited by the employee ‘arising out of or during the course of employment’. Under Section 13 of the POSH Act, the recommendations and report of the ICC are to be sent to the ‘employer’ which shall then take a decision with respect to initiation of disciplinary action. In light of the OM dated 16.07.2025, the ICC has a dual-role – to conduct the preliminary / fact finding inquiry under the POSH Act and to act as the inquiry authority in the formal disciplinary proceedings under the CCS CCA Rules, 1965 as discussed, since nothing prevents the ICC constituted at the Department of the aggrieved woman from conducting the preliminary / fact-finding inquiry and upon receiving the report of the said ICC, if the employer initiates disciplinary proceedings, the ICC constituted at the Department of the ‘respondent’ shall act as the inquiry authority in the disciplinary proceedings. 
28. Surender Kumar v. State of HP [2025] GCtR 1825 (SC) on criminal Law. It was held that as far as Exception 4 of S.300 of IPC is concerned, an act of culpable homicide does not amount to murder if following ingredients are fulfilled (i) there is no pre-meditation; (ii) there is a sudden fight; (iii) the act is committed in the heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant has not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Although the term ‘fight’ has not been defined in IPC, but the consistent view is that it implies mutual assault by use of criminal force and not mere verbal duel.  Where the accused is armed and the deceased is unarmed, Exception 2 can have no application and Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC would not apply if there is sudden quarrel but no fight between the deceased and the accused. It was held that ‘fight’ postulates a bilateral transaction in which blows are exchanged.
29. In case of Rani @ Raj Kumari v. Kamlakat Gupta [2025] GCtR 1827 (SC) compensation under MV Act, 1988 was enhanced. It was held that in a case of accident that took place in the year 2009,  it is reasonable to accept that the deceased was getting Rs. 6,000/- as monthly salary from the stone crusher company, for, it is normal to expect that a person employed in this stone crusher unit would earn Rs. 6,000/- every month. The rate of interest of 6% granted by MACT was found to be low and interest rate was also enhanced.
30. It has been held in Shri Karshni Alloys Pvt Ltd v. Ramakrishnan Sadasivan [2025] GCtR 1829 (SC) that time is a crucial facet of the scheme under the IBC, 2016 and to allow such proceedings to lapse into indefinite delay would plainly defeat the very object of the statute. 
31. It has been held in Saraswati Wire and Cable Industries v. Mohammad Moinuddin Khan [2025] GCtR 1830 (SC) that adjudicating authority dealing with an application filed under Section 9 of the IBC, 2016 is required to determine whether there is an operational debt; whether evidence has been furnished to show that the said debt was due and payable but had not been paid; and whether there was any dispute in existence between the parties or any suit or arbitration was pending in relation to such dispute on the date of receipt of the demand notice of the unpaid operational debt. It would be important to separate the grain from the chaff and to reject a spurious defence which was mere bluster and that, while doing so, the Court did not need to be satisfied that the defence was even likely to succeed. It was clarified that, at that stage, the Court would not examine the merits of the dispute in toto and as long as the dispute truly existed in fact and was not spurious, hypothetical or illusory, the adjudicating authority would be entitled to reject the application. 
32. In case of K.S. Dinachandran v. Shyla Joseph [2025] GCtR 1847 (SC), it was held that "there is one important feature which distinguishes wills from other documents. Unlike other documents the will speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a court, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the departed testator. Even so, in dealing with the proof of wills the court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will." 
33. It has been held in Nayan Bhowmick v. Aparna Chakraborty [2025] GCtR 1848 (SC) that approach of the Courts should be to preserve the sanctity of marriage and the Court should be reluctant to dissolve the marriage at the mere asking of one of the parties. Pendency of matrimonial litigation for a long duration only leads to perpetuity of marriage on paper. It is in the best interest of parties and the society if ties are severed between parties in cases where litigation has been pending for a considerably long period of time.
34. In case of State of UP v. Ajmal Beg [2025] GCtR 1849 (SC) it is held that "the law [S.8 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961] provides for the appointment of Dowry Prohibition Officers in States. It is to be ensured that these officers are duly deputed, aware of their responsibilities and given the necessary wherewithal to carry out the duties entrusted to them. The contact details (name, official phone number and email ID) of such an officer designated to this position are disseminated adequately by the local authorities ensuring awareness of citizens of the area".
35. It has been held in Jayantibhai Chaturbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat [2025] GCtR 1850 (SC) that "where the witness has been declared hostile, the court should be slow to act on the testimony of such a witness." Accused acquitted of offence under S.376 of IPC. 
36. It has been held in Sanjay Kumar Upadhyay v. State of Jharkhand [2025] GCtR 1851 (SC) that "it is well-established that in matters involving pay scale parity based on removal of anomalies, the cause of action continues from month to month as long as the anomaly persists. Every month when the employee receives lesser pay than his similarly situated counterparts constitutes a fresh cause of action." Financial implications and administrative convenience cannot override constitutional guarantees against arbitrary discrimination. The State, being the model employer, cannot plead its own inefficiency or negligence to deny legitimate rights to its employees. The plea of delay and laches cannot be sustained in a case involving continuing violation of rights that too in the light of the nature of directions issued in rem.
37. The case of Cement Corporation of India v. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd [2025] GCtR 1852 (SC) has given a categorical finding on whether it is permissible for insurance company to repudiate an insurance claim by arguing that the peril was not covered under the insurance policy ? Setting aside the repudiation letter it was held that it is a settled position that if the damage is caused by fire, then the reason by which the fire took place becomes irrelevant. In case of insurance contracts, the exclusion clause must be construed strictly and wherever there is any ambiguity between two or more clauses in the contract, it must be interpreted in favour of the insured.
38. It has been held in Kiran v. State of Karnataka [2025] GCtR 1853 (SC) that "the sentence of life imprisonment no doubt means the entire life, subject only to the remission and commutation provided under Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and also to Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India, which cannot be curtailed by a Sessions Court. Nor can the Sessions Court, a creation of the Cr.PC curtail the provision under Section 428, Cr.PC, available in the Code which created it." "Though life sentence literally denotes imprisonment till the last breath, it operates only as an imprisonment for 14 years with the power of remission and commutation conferred on the Government. Balancing, the need to provide proportionate punishment at least in crimes which shocks human society, with the need to avoid death; an irreversible penalty, a middle ground was found.  in appropriate cases as a uniform policy, punishment of imprisonment for life beyond any remission can be awarded, substituting the death penalty; not only by the Supreme Court but also by the High Courts. The power to impose punishment of imprisonment for life without remission was conferred only on the Constitutional Courts and not on the Sessions Courts. Sentence of life imprisonment cannot be directed to be till the end of natural life, by the Sessions Court which direction would be in conflict with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973."
39. In case of Obalappa v. Pawan Kumar Bhihani [2025] GCtR 1854 (SC) it was pointed out that in this case "there was clear ambiguity in the identification of the schedule property and the location of Site No.66, even on a mere perusal of the pleadings. It was incumbent upon the plaintiffs/respondents, hence, to have identified the property by seeking deputation of a Commissioner who could have identified the same with the assistance of a Surveyor. The High Court seriously erred in having relied on the alleged survey carried out by the BDA." It was held that "the document, though produced by the plaintiff who deposed before Court, production is not proof and the author of the said document, the Surveyor/Land Acquisition Officer was not examined before Court."
40. The case of Manoj @ Munna v. State of Chhattisgarh [2025] GCtR 1856 (SC) has discussed issue touching criminal law. "It is a settled proposition that whenever any doubt emanates in the mind of the Court, the benefit shall accrue to the accused and not the prosecution." "Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does not dilute or substitute the prosecution’s fundamental obligation to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable  doubt. Rather, it comes into operation only in situations where the prosecution has already established a reasonable inference against the accused." 
41. In the case of Syed Shahnawaz Ali v. State of MP [2025] GCtR 1871 (SC) the case arose out of allegations under S.420 of IPC. It was held that revisional power under Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is a discretionary power, the exercise of which cannot be claimed as of right ; the role of the revisionist is essentially that of a person who invites attention of the Court that an occasion to exercise the revisional power has arisen. Strict rule of locus does not apply to a revision proceeding. 

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